Ethical perspectives on climate policy and climate economics by Roser, Dominic
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2010
Ethical perspectives on climate policy and climate
economics
Roser, D
Roser, D. Ethical perspectives on climate policy and climate economics. 2010, University of Zurich,
Faculty of Economics.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Roser, D. Ethical perspectives on climate policy and climate economics. 2010, University of Zurich,
Faculty of Economics.
Roser, D. Ethical perspectives on climate policy and climate economics. 2010, University of Zurich,
Faculty of Economics.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Roser, D. Ethical perspectives on climate policy and climate economics. 2010, University of Zurich,
Faculty of Economics.
Ethical perspectives on climate policy and climate
economics
Abstract
This dissertation treats selected topics in the moral appraisal of climate policy and climate
economics. The chapter on discounting argues that doing justice to future generations is not
about determining the appropriate weight to be given to their utility. Rather, it is about using
a non-consequentialist framework which resists weighing up the utility of present and future
generations. It is pointed out, however, that due to the opportunity cost argument discounting
is still relevant in a certain sense. In conclusion, it is discussed why the debate on discounting
is normative rather than simply descriptive and why there is so much room for perplexity in
the debate on discounting. The chapter on uncertainty argues that a rights-sensitive
decision-maker has additional reasons for risk-aversion compared to a utilitarian
decision-maker. Several ways to capture rights in a formal model are presented in order to
make the point. Intuitively, rights lead to risk-aversion because a probability of "overfulfilling"
rights does not make up in a straightforward way for an equal probability of infringing rights.
The chapter on historical emissions focuses on global justice in mitigation and adaptation.
Based on a prioritarian theory of distributive justice aiming at a fair distribution of benefits
from emission generating activities the chapter comes to the conclusion that inhabitants of the
South should receive larger shares of the emission rights that are currently up for distribution
than inhabitants of the North. The damages resulting from the high levels of historical
emissions of the North might seem to call for the application of compensatory justice. Several
difficulties with this view are pointed out and it is suggested that coping with climate
damages is largely an issue of distributive justice.
 Diese Dissertation behandelt ausgewählte Themen im Bereich der ethischen Beurteilung von
Klimapolitik und Klimaökonomie. Das Kapitel über das Diskontieren argumentiert, dass es
bei Gerechtigkeit gegenüber zukünftigen Generationen nicht darum geht, das Gewicht zu
bestimmen, welches ihrem Nutzen zugeschrieben werden sollte, sondern um die Anwendung
einer nicht-konsequentialistischen Theorie, welche davon absieht, gegenwärtigen und
zukünftigen Nutzen gegeneinander aufzuwiegen. Es wird jedoch darauf hingewiesen, dass
aufgrund des Opportunitätskostenarguments das Diskontieren in einer bestimmten Weise
trotzdem relevant ist. Zum Schluss wird begründet, weshalb es in der Diskontierungsdebatte
um normative und nicht bloss um deskriptive Prämissen geht, und es wird diskutiert, weshalb
diese Debatte so viel Verwirrung zu stiften vermag. Das Kapitel über Unsicherheit
argumentiert, dass ein Entscheidungsträger, der auf Rechte Bezug nimmt, mehr Gründe für
Risikoaversion hat als ein Utilitarist. Um dies zu zeigen, werden verschiedene formale
Modelle von Rechten präsentiert. Intuitiv führen Rechte deshalb zu Risikoaversion, weil eine
gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit, Rechte zu verletzen, nicht auf einfache Weise mit einer gleich
grossen Wahrscheinlichkeit, Rechte zu "übererfüllen", wettgemacht werden kann. Im Kapitel
über historische Emissionen geht es um globale Gerechtigkeit bezüglich Mitigation und
Adaptation. Um zu begründen, weshalb der Süden höhere Anteile an Emissionsrechten als der
Norden erhalten sollte, wird die Vorrangssicht auf Begünstigungen angewandt, die in
emissionsgenerierenden Aktivitäten wurzeln. Die Schäden aus den hohen historischen
Emissionen des Nordens scheinen Anlass zur Anwendung kompensatorischer Gerechtigkeit
zu geben. Verschiedene Einwände gegen diese Position werden dargestellt und es wird
nahegelegt, auch den Umgang mit Klimaschäden grösstenteils als Problem der
Verteilungsgerechtigkeit anzusehen. 
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1 Introduction
1.1 Times Have Changed
I can vividly remember the reservations I had about the topic of climate
justice before entering this field of research some years ago. Not that I
doubted the significance of climate change or the importance of justice,
each taken separately. It was the linkage I worried about. I assumed that
mixing the two issues must be rooted in the unfounded assumption that for
some mysterious reason all the various evils in this world – such as climate
change, environmental degradation in general, poverty, or global inequality
– must go hand in hand with each other.
My doubts were dispelled immediately on starting to engage seriously
with this topic. It quickly became obvious that climate change truly presents
us with a “perfect moral storm”. Stephen Gardiner (2006b) used this expres-
sion in reference to a “perfect storm” on the North American Atlantic coast
which was made prominent in popular culture by means of a movie with
the same title. Just as the confluence of various weather-related phenomena
combined to create this exceptionally hard storm, various moral intricacies
join forces in the area of climate change to create an exceptionally grave
moral issue. According to Gardiner, the three problems of dispersion of
causes and effects, fragmentation of agency and institutional inadequacy to
deal with the problem appear on both a global and an intergenerational
level. These global and intergenerational storms converge with a theoretical
storm: our ineptitude, given the state of moral theory which historically
has not been concerned with problems of such a nature, to deal with issues
1
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such as scientific uncertainty, intergenerational equity, contingent persons
and non-human nature. A perfect storm indeed.
Moreover, it is not a storm in a teacup. The sheer size of the problem
is staggering. Has politics ever seen the people of this planet meeting to
divide among themselves a good of equal value as the “carbon pie” which is
currently up for negotiation? What other policy-controlled risk in the last
centuries has involved such a global and long-term scale?
Only a short time ago, these novel, weighty, and complex ethical ques-
tions associated with the emission of greenhouse gases were not common
knowledge. After acquainting myself with them, I had to introduce them
innumerable times over the past years to questioning colleagues and friends.
But today, this is hardly necessary anymore. At the point of writing this in-
troduction, negotiators are discussing the future of climate policy in Copen-
hagen and as can be witnessed from their speeches and from the newspaper
editorials, familiarity with the moral facets of climate change is nowadays
taken for granted.
These moral facets of climate change are the topic of this doctoral thesis.
Chapters 2 and 3 discuss selected aspects of intergenerational justice as
they arise in a specifically economic approach to climate policy.1 Chapter 4
deals with aspects of global justice in mitigation and adaptation and it does
so with particular regard to the relevance of historical emissions. In this
introduction I will first give an overview of the questions of justice involved
in climate change (section 1.2), followed by remarks on theories of justice
in general and their application to the intergenerational context (1.3). I
will then introduce the chapters (1.4 – 1.6) and close with comments about
limitations (1.7) and about the interdisciplinary approach of this thesis (1.8).
1 A more synoptical perspective on the moral questions which arise in the economics
of climate change can be found in Meyer and Roser (2008) which is based on Meyer
and Roser (2007).
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1.2 Overview
Climate justice is concerned with a number of goods and bads: First, the
benefits of pursuing activities which increase the emission concentration in
the atmosphere or, respectively, themitigation costs of foregoing these activ-
ities, second, the climate damages which are a side effect of these activities,
and third, adaption costs for coping with these damages.
Four general features of anthropogenic climate change jointly define the
basic set-up of problems faced by a theory of climate justice. Firstly, climate
change is a long-term issue. A considerable part of the effect of greenhouse
gas emissions materializes only after a time lag of several decades. Secondly,
climate change is characterized by uncertainty. While there is little doubt
that climate change will generally be detrimental rather than beneficial to
humanity (and to a large part of non-human nature), there is large uncer-
tainty about its exact extent. Thirdly, climate change is disproportionally
caused by people in developed countries. Finally, climate change dispropor-
tionally affects people in developing countries.2
The complexity of climate science and its attending controversies can
sometimes hide the fact that these core issues are subject to hardly any
disagreement within current mainstream climate research. These issues –
which are already sufficient to generate the intricate constellation of prob-
lems for climate ethics – can count as settled. They point to three central
questions to be answered by a theory of climate justice:
How much mitigation?
The first question asks what global quota of emissions can be justified (for a
certain time span). A number of considerations might be adduced to answer
this question. First, duties towards non-human nature are a ground for lim-
iting emissions. Second, given that the detrimental effect of emissions also
2 For support of these basic points and for any detail beyond them, see the work by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which is widely accepted
as an authority.
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affects the emitters themselves, considerations of self-interest are a reason
for capping emissions. Third, again taking into account the near-term effects
of emissions, considerations of global justice – i.e. contemporaries harming
contemporaries through emissions – are a further reason for restricting emis-
sions. Fourth, duties towards future generations provide a justification for
keeping the global emission budget sufficiently low. In this thesis, I will take
the fourth point, i.e. intergenerational justice, as the central consideration
for determining the size of a justifiable global quota. In chapter 2, I discuss
the question of discounting in relation to intergenerational justice. And in
chapter 3, I investigate the relevance of uncertainty for the specification of
duties of intergenerational justice.
Who should bear the mitigation burden?
The second question takes the answer to the first question as a given and
asks how the pre-determined emission quota should be split up among na-
tions, regions, companies, or, ultimately, individuals. This can also be ex-
pressed as a question about the assignment of emission reductions relative
to the status quo. Whilst I take the first question to be primarily a question
of intergenerational justice, the second question is primarily a question of
intragenerational global and social justice.3 Chapter 4 deals with this ques-
tion, with particular consideration given to the fact of unequal historical
emissions of the North and the South.
Who should bear the adaptation burden?
Given a certain level of mitigation effort as determined by an answer to
the first question, a corresponding degree of climate change will result. An
answer to the third question then determines the extent of effort to be
undertaken to cope with this change and the distribution of payments for
3 It does not, however, lack an intertemporal dimension as well because the timing of
a given amount of emission reductions is an open question.
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doing so. Like the second question, this is mostly a question of global and
social justice.4 Accordingly, this question is also considered in chapter 4.
1.3 Distributive Justice
The three most important questions for theories of distributive justice typi-
cally are: distribute what, among whom, and how? Here, the how-question
is in the spotlight. Conceptions which have been prominently discussed in
recent debates are egalitarianism, sufficientarianism, and the priority view
(cf. for example Holtug and Lippert-Rasmussen (2007) or Krebs (2000)).
They all oppose utilitarianism by refusing to evaluate distributions soley in
terms of whether goods yield the highest possible benefit. Prioritarianism
and sufficientarianism can both be seen as reactions to problems of egali-
tarianism. Insofar as egalitarianism views equality as an intrinsic value, it
runs into the “levelling down objection”: In one respect it sees something
better about a situation where everyone is equally badly off compared to a
situation where some are badly off and some are well off. This reveals egal-
itarianism’s principal concern to be comparative facts and not the absolute
level of well-being of people. Prioritarianism, by contrast, does not deny
that it is in all respects better that any given person has more benefits than
less – even if this implies inequality – but it combines this view with the
claim that it is more important for the less well off to receive benefits. This
second point should not be equated with the idea of diminishing marginal
utility in economics, i.e. with the idea that a given amount of a good yields
more utility in the hands of a person who owns few goods. The idea is
rather that a given amount of utility (or whatever conception of benefit one
employs) itself is of varying moral importance depending on who receives it.
Sufficientarianism suggests a different way to build a coherent theory out
of our intuitions about distributional matters. It gives central importance
4 It does neither lack an intertemporal dimension because the present generation can
make investments into the adaptive capacity of future generations.
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to a threshold and it can make both a positive and a negative thesis with
respect to this threshold. The positive thesis claims that it is of utmost
concern that people live above the specified threshold; the negative the-
sis claims that additional distributive demands (e.g. above the threshold)
shrink to insignificance. Any of these approaches to distributive justice as
well as utilitarianism can additionally take note of the instrumental value
of equality.5
Chapter 4 takes the priority view to be a plausible theory for issues of
global justice and applies it to the distribution of mitigation and adapta-
tion burdens. Chapters 2 and 3 tackle issues of intergenerational justice and
whilst I do not take an explicit stance in those chapters (in order to operate
on as minimal premises as possible), I want to briefly mention some consid-
erations which make a sufficientarian conception of intergenerational justice
more convincing than its rivals.6 Relations among humans of different gen-
erations exhibit a number of features which are absent from relations among
contemporaries. The fact that the presently living can affect the existence,
number, and identity of persons living in the future has philosophically per-
plexing implications such as the non-identity problem (made prominent in
particular by Parfit (1984)). A plausible response to the non-identity prob-
lem which grounds the case for an intergenerational sufficientarianism is a
threshold notion of harm and in particular a sufficientarian specification of
this threshold. Besides the general problems of egalitarianism mentioned
above, this can be based on the following arguments. Firstly, the case for
egalitarianism among a certain group of humans sometimes relies on these
humans cooperating with each other in a mutually beneficial way or their
interacting in a common institutional structure, which they shape through
collective decision-making. Such cooperation and interaction is not given
5 A somewhat more extensive description of the contrast between these theories can
be found in two texts not included in this thesis: Meyer and Roser (2006) and Meyer
and Roser (2009).
6 These considerations are laid out in detail in Meyer and Roser (2009)
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among non-overlapping generations, or at least not in a straightforward way.
Secondly, the priority view has the same problems as utilitarianism in the in-
tergenerational context. If the number of future people is sufficiently large,
it places unreasonably large demands on the presently living generation.
Thirdly, and independently of the aforementioned, if we aimed at actually
implementing a truly egalitarian conception of intergenerational justice, the
downsides of the institutional structures necessary to achieve this ambitious
goal – such as a world government or, more far-fetched, an eco-dictatorship –
might far outweigh the desirable features of equality. Fourthly, and again on
the practical side, the informational requirements for achieving sufficiency
in the future are much lower than the requirements for achieving equal-
ity. It is much more difficult to guess the conception of the good of future
persons living in completely different technological, cultural, and religious
circumstances than it is to estimate what they need in order to have enough.
Fifthly, instrumental grounds for equality – such as the social stability and
the sense of community fostered by equality – are less important in the in-
tergenerational context than among contemporaries. Finally, it is unclear
whether a theory which demands nothing more than equality would leave
enough reasons for generations who live below a subsistence threshold to
make their descendants better off than themselves. It could thus justify a
history without poverty-eradicating human progress. These considerations
tell against a purely egalitarian or prioritarian approach to intergenerational
justice and give reason to support sufficientarianism.
1.4 Chapter 2: Discounting
This chapter deals with the issue of discounting, which has recently come to
new prominence as a result of the growing importance of economic models
of climate change. It makes two claims about the appropriateness of dis-
counting the utility of future generations. Firstly, it argues that discounting
in the sense of ascribing a certain weight to the utility of future generations
7
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(“genuine discounting”) is not only wrong but primarily unnecessary. De-
termining a discount rate in this genuine sense is only necessary within
frameworks that implausibly prescribe weighing up the utility of present
and future generations. Secondly, it argues that “non-genuine” discounting
in the sense of taking into account opportunity costs, i.e. the fact that
alternative investments to climate mitigation measures have positive rates
of return, too, is justified. In addition, it argues that normative reasoning
cannot be overlooked in the debate on discounting. To conclude, it suggests
three reasons why the discussion on the discount rate is so perplexing.
The chapter is addressed to both political philosophers and economists
but it is written so as to be largely comprehensible to people who are un-
familiar with the practice of discounting and economics in general. It aims
at explicating the core issues, rather than pursuing various ramifications of
the debate. It shares a common theme with chapter 3: Insofar as standard
economics does lead to certain unacceptable conclusions, the main culprit is
its underlying utilitarianism which is insensitive to deontological concerns.
Amongst the three chapters, chapter 2 is the one with the most direct
application to policy-making. The balance of discounted benefits in the far
future over present costs ought not to be a major consideration in choosing
climate policy. Rather, mitigation targets should be set by reference to what
we owe to future generations as determined by a theory of intergenerational
justice and by reference to the returns of investments other than climate
mitigation.
1.5 Chapter 3: Uncertainty
This chapter discusses the large uncertainties about the future which play a
central role in climate policy. Proponents of the “precautionary principle”
typically suggest that the risk-aversion which standard economics justifies
by means of the curvature of the utility function is not enough. The chapter
argues that we can make sense of the vague intuition which underlies these
8
1.5 Chapter 3: Uncertainty
calls for a precautionary principle if we replace the utilitarianism of standard
economics by a rights-sensitive approach. Respecting the rights of future
generations yields an additional reason for risk-aversion based on how the
utility of future generations enters the present generation’s choice problem.
In order to argue for this claim, three alternative models of capturing rights
in a formalized model are presented. They all diverge from the standard
utilitarian objective of maximizing aggregate utility. According to these
models, the concerns of future generations enter the choice problem of the
present-day decision-maker in a different way than the present-day decision-
maker’s own concerns. Compared to furthering his own utility, the present-
day decision-maker must give high importance to avoiding the downside risk
of violating the rights of future generations while it may give low importance
to the upside risk of benefiting future generations beyond the fulfillment
of rights. This asymmetry makes for the risk-aversion inherent in rights-
sensitivity.
The chapter is adressed primarily to an audience of economists. It is
intended as an explorative enterprise. Because the normative ideals of util-
itarianism are captured much more easily in formal language than deonto-
logical concepts, and because economics was so successful at investigating
decision-making based on a utilitarian logic over the past decades, impor-
tant territory has been left unexplored. Carried by the conviction that
decision-making based on a respect for rights cannot be discarded (both
from the point of view of common sense morality as well as from the point
of view of prominent positions in critically reflected morality), I ventured
into this insufficiently explored territory. My goal was to examine options
for representing central features of non-utilitarian decision-making and to
examine their implications.
The chapter could be extended in several directions. One might apply
the three proposed models not only to risk-aversion but also to prudence
(in the technical sense, cf. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)). It might
also be valuable to examine further the reasons for the difficulty of rep-
9
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resenting trade-off resistance. Another avenue for future research might
consist in transforming the normative conclusions into empirical hypothe-
ses and in experimentally investigating the relevance of rights thinking for
risk-aversion.7
Except for its support for our precautionary intuitions, the chapter is not
primarily intended to be directly applicable to policy-making. Rather, it
sends two messages to the discourse on the relevance of scientific uncer-
tainty for climate policy. Firstly, it adresses theorists who are accustomed
to the paradigm of expected utility theory and it argues that their approach
is insufficiently risk-averse. Secondly, given that the basic logic of deonto-
logical thinking already constitutes a straightforward and weighty reason for
cautiousness in the face of risk, the chapter questions the value of the search
in the current literature for further and sometimes far-fetched rationales for
a precautionary principle.
1.6 Chapter 4: North-South Justice
The final chapter is co-authored by Lukas Meyer and myself.8 It discusses
justice in mitigation and adaptation, giving special consideration to the fact
of unequal historical emissions between the North and the South. Climate
change can be interpreted as a unique case of historical injustice. It inter-
sects intergenerational justice and global justice in a specific way. The chap-
ter answers two questions: First, how should emission rights be distributed?
Second, who should bear the costs of coping with climate change? The first
question is treated as belonging exclusively to the domain of distributive
justice. The chapter argues, on prioritarian grounds, that the developing
world should receive higher per capita emission rights than the developed
world. This is justified by the fact that the latter already owns a larger share
7 Some points which are left unexplored in the chapter have been discussed in two
manuscripts (Roser (2008, 2009)).
8 A few topics mentioned in the chapter, such as emissions trading and grandfathering,
are discussed at somewhat greater length in an earlier article co-authored by us
(Meyer and Roser (2006)).
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of benefits associated with emission generating activities because of its past
record of industrialisation. At first glance, the second question appears to
be an issue of compensatory justice. However, after defining compensation,
it is shown that different kinds of compensatory principles run into prob-
lems when used to justify payments by historical emitters of the North to
people suffering from climate change in the South. As an alternative, the
chapter proposes to view payments from wealthy countries for adaptation in
vulnerable countries as a measure based on concerns of global distributive
justice.
The chapter is addressed to political philosophers. In comparison with
the other chapters, it goes into greater detail and devotes more time to
examining various ramifications of the discussion. Its relevance for matters
of policy is clear: past and current (and on realistic expectations: future)
patterns of emissions and climate policy are unjustly disadvantageous to the
South and unfairly advantageous to the North. This conclusion is hardly
surprising. The importance of the chapter lies in giving a sound foundation
for this conclusion, by revealing how various considerations all point in the
same direction and also in making clear which arguments can not be adduced
to support this conclusion.
1.7 Limitations
I conclude the synopsis of the chapters with a short and non-exhaustive
list of topics which are absent from this thesis. This serves as a disclaimer
in that their absence is in no way meant to indicate their irrelevance for
a complete theory of climate justice. Firstly, this thesis is about justice
among humans rather than the appropriate treatment of non-human nature
by humans. Secondly, I generally work with the simplified model of two or
three, possibly non-overlapping, generations rather than with the realistic
picture of humans continuously entering and leaving the existing population.
Thirdly, there are important issues of justice which cannot be captured by a
11
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coarse-grained distinction between the North and the South. Justice among
individual persons characterized by a more detailed description than their
belonging to a certain region of the planet is left as a topic for future work.
Fourthly, population growth is not discussed. Fifthly, the legitimacy and
feasibility of emissions trading are not discussed. Sixthly, it is crucial to
have answers to questions about justice in transition and to questions of
“non-ideal” theory (cf. for example Swift (2008)), i.e. answers which yield
action-guiding results concerning the appropriate first steps in reducing the
justice deficit in a world characterized by less than full compliance, limited
motivation, institutional inadequacy, etc. Seventhly, moral demands for
change in personal lifestyles rather than political solutions are not discussed.
1.8 Interdisciplinary Research
This doctoral thesis was a project in the Graduate Programme for Research
in Interdisciplinary Ethics, it is submitted to the Department of Economics,
its main focus are questions in normative ethics, and it is adressed to audi-
ences in both economics and moral philosophy. It is thus interdisciplinary
in many respects.
Interdisciplinary research is attributed a very positive aura these days.
But engaging in it is often less straightforward than one might hope. Sur-
prisingly, the main challenges are not the different subject matters or the
different methodologies of the various disciplines. The main challenge is
the different mindset prevailing in the different departments. What seems
obvious and easy in the perspective of people trained in one area, seems
controversial and intricate to people trained in another, and vice versa. In-
terestingly, I was able to observe the distance between the unquestioned
background assumptions and basic paradigms reigning in the hallways of
different departments in my own biography. Some years after shifting from
economics to philosophy as my main focus, positions which seemed unthink-
able or irrelevant to me slowly metamorphosed into plausible and relevant
12
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positions. In order to be understood and taken seriously by one discipline,
it is sometimes necessary to generalize crudely in the eyes of the other (note,
however, that this can also serve as a cheap excuse). Interdisciplinary work
is not a safe business. It has more resemblance to investments into venture
capital than into government bonds: A large part of the effort is fruitless
(note, again, that this can serve as a cheap excuse), but the occasional pos-
itive output often turns out to be a true pearl. These pearls are not the
only justification for engaging in the effort. Interdisciplinary research is also
important because the public has a legitimate interest for disciplines which
treat the same subject matter to stay within earshot of each other. This
enables them to give a unified picture of their subject or else to speak a
sufficiently common language which allows them to explain why they di-
verge. Also, whole disciplines can get trapped in unhelpful paradigms and
interdisciplinary work can be instrumental in stirring up such situations and
opening up new directions. Finally, work at the interface is of course impor-
tant because different disciplines use each other’s output as input in their
own field of study.
In any case, I enjoyed the crossing of boundaries in writing this thesis.
And I hope the reader will enjoy the result.
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2 Discounting and its Discontents
2.1 Introduction
There is a small, inconspicuous parameter in the midst of many lines of
formulae in economic models of climate change that generates hot debates.
The discussion of this number made it into the popular press and forced
economists to delve into moral arguments and conversely prompted moral
philosophers to work on mathematical expressions. Both sides found each
other amateurish at times and even professional commentators made mis-
takes (cf. Quiggin (2008, p. 201)). The parameter in question is the discount
rate. This number expresses how much less something in the future counts
than the same thing today.
The real-world relevance of this technical debate should not be underes-
timated. The choice of the discount rate dwarfs almost any other aspect of
economic models of climate change. These models can be further refined or
increasingly sophisticated, but when it comes to the results they yield, the
scientific and philosophical disagreements about the discount rate make all
the difference. Many economists – most famously, William Nordhaus – are
on the side of those who warn against rash or costly action against climate
change. Other economists – most notably, Nicholas Stern – call for urgent
action. Their disagreement is above all explained by their different choice
of discount rates. This choice has huge effects: William Nordhaus (2008,
ch. V) estimates the net cost of basing policy on Stern’s views to be around
$20 trillion relative to the policy determined as optimal in his calculations.
Tol (2008, p. 3) demonstrates that a discount rate of 0% estimates total
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damage from a ton of CO2 to be more than ten times higher on average
than a discount rate of 3%.
When economists calculate the costs and benefits of climate change this
is more than “academic gymnastics”: They are heard in the policy arena.
Particularly, in the United States, cost-benefit analysis is given high priority.
The Stern report had a huge impact on the media and served as an authority
in innumerable arguments made on behalf of stringent climate policy.
What about this number has the potential to bring about so much discus-
sion and disagreement? If a climate economist has to express the damage
done by a ton of CO2, he will come up with an estimate of the damage it
does each year and add those damages up. In adding up, he will value dam-
age done in the future much less than damage done today. With a discount
rate of 3%, damage of 100 units in 100 years will be valued as only about 5
units today. Many economists will go on to claim that preventing damage of
100 units in 100 years is therefore not worth more investments into mitiga-
tion measures than about 5 units today – otherwise the net present value of
the measure would be negative. If we scale up the length of the time frame
and calculate how much it might be worth to prevent catastrophic climate
change, which, say, wipes out half of global welfare in 200 years, then by
the same reasoning such catastrophic damage would only be valued today
at less than 0.25% of the damage it would do in 200 years. According to
this logic, it seems that such a catastrophe is not worthy of much attention.
But this kind of thinking is shocking to many. Damages in the future, so
it seems, should not be seen as less important than damages in the present
simply because they accrue at different points in time.
But is this really so? In many cases, valuing one and the same good
differently depending on time seems completely natural. Imagine that you
find out that 100 years ago your mother borrowed $5 from your neighbour
and that you now want to give the money back to your neighbour’s family.
How much should you give back to them? If your neighbours had kept the $5
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and had invested the money at an interest rate of 3%, it would have grown
to around $100 today. $5 accruing 100 years ago can correspond in value to
$100 today. (Notice that this is not only due to inflation. Typically, there
is a positive (real) interest rate even without inflation). So, it does seem
appropriate to value the same good vastly differently at different points in
time even though this seemed implausible in the climate mitigation case.
Can value be more or less valuable depending on time? The paradoxical
language reveals that there is a conundrum.
This chapter joins the debate by tackling one central question and two
minor ones. The central question is: Should we discount future utility, and
if yes, how much? “The future” is in particular taken to stand for future
generations. In order to answer the question two senses of discounting are
distinguished: Genuine discounting (“Discounting as Weighting”) and “non-
genuine” discounting (“Discounting as Representing Opportunity Cost”).
The former is discussed in section 2.2 and is dismissed. It is dismissed not
only as wrong but primarily as irrelevant. The latter is discussed in section
2.3 and is supported.
Some texts on discounting deem it sufficient to make general points and
leave the reader uncertain as to how the arguments cash out in terms of their
implications for economic models of climate change. Therefore, section 2.4
summarises and discusses what section 2.2 and 2.3 amount to. One way
in which this can be done is by answering two concrete questions that are
examples of the kind of question to which one must have an answer at
the end of the day (and which are useful to keep in mind while reading as
questions of this kind ultimately drive the whole debate). First, should a
climate mitigation measure that costs 5 units of utility today and increases
utility by 100 hundred units in 100 years be pursued? Second, what is the
total cost of emitting a ton of CO2 if its emission leads to a utility loss of 1
unit per year for the next 100 years?
After the central question has been treated, sections 2.5 and 2.6 then
add discussions of two minor issues. First, does the debate on discounting
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treat a normative or a descriptive issue? Second, why does the discounting
question have so much potential to puzzle and perplex?
A few disclaimers: First, this chapter is only concerned with the utility
discount rate (also called the “pure time discount rate”, the “rate of pure
time preference”, or the “inherent discount rate”). This rate tells us how to
discount future utility rather than future wealth (or goods). For the latter,
there are separate and often less controversial reasons for discounting, in
particular the expectation that future generations will be richer and that
they will therefore draw less utility from an additional unit of wealth than
the presently living. Typical values for the utility discount rate lie between
0% and 3% per year (cf. the numbers used by Tol (2008, p. 3)). Second,
“utility” here denotes well-being (or whatever it is that is of intrinsic value
and of which it is good to have more). This is in alignment with cost-benefit
analysis (of which climate economics is an example) where utility is typi-
cally seen as something that increases with wealth and possibly with other
factors such as environmental quality. In decision theory, the term “utility”
can refer to other and more abstract concepts (e.g. whatever it is that can
be portrayed as being maximized in behaviour regardless of whether the
maximand is of value or is considered to be of value by the agent). We
only use it because in the discounting debate it is the more common term
than “well-being”. Third and importantly, we concede other controversial
premises presupposed in cost-benefit analysis for the time being, particu-
larly the premise that all values that enter the consequentialist calculus are
commensurable, can be quantified and count only insofar as they contribute
to utility. This means inter alia that climate damages affecting future gen-
erations can in principle be weighed up by other goods, such as economic
growth. The reason for bracketing such controversial premises lies in the
goal of this chapter, which is to argue on the economist’s own terrain and to
cut through to the debate that is specific to discounting. Fourth, the focus
of this chapter lies on the question of discounting utility of future genera-
tions rather than future utility within one’s own lifetime. To simplify, we
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therefore assume non-overlapping generations. We also abstract from the
fact that generations are composed of many persons and we thereby exclude
questions of intragenerational distributive justice. Fifth, we exclude uncer-
tainty. Finally, note that nothing in this chapter is specific to climate policy
but applies more broadly to any policy that has effects spread out over time.
2.2 Genuine Discounting: Probably Wrong But Above
All Unnecessary
Should we discount the utility that our descendants will enjoy simply be-
cause it occurs in the future? Presupposing impartiality, neutrality, univer-
salisability, equality, non-arbitrariness, or any other similar moral desider-
atum, giving less weight to utility that accrues to future generations is at
least prima facie implausible. This is particularly so for the theory within
which the debate on discounting is at home: Utilitarianism. Economic
cost-benefit analysis that has brought the discounting problem to attention
espouses utilitarianism’s ideal of maximizing the sum of good regardless to
whom the good accrues. With this core idea utilitarianism has no resources
to come up with a rationale for counting the consequences of a policy for
some persons less than the consequences for other persons. This would im-
ply foregoing the maximization of aggregate good (where aggregate good
is the unweighted sum of the good accruing to individuals). Economists
might insist that they define good in terms of preference satisfaction, and
that what must be maximized is the aggregate preference satisfaction of the
present generation, which is the one currently deciding on policies, and that
the preferences of the present generation do, as a matter of fact, exhibit pos-
itive time preference. But this rejoinder solves no problems: Once one pre-
suposses that aggregate preference satisfaction is something of importance
there is no rationale why a concern with aggregate preference satisfaction
should be limited to aggregating only the satisfaction of preferences of the
subset of humans who live now and who decide on the policy. Given that a
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positive discount rate is, to say the least, not suggestive at first sight (and
given that, in addition, there are worked out arguments against it; see for
example the contributions by Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit in Fishkin and
Laslett (1992)), the burden of proof lies with those who argue for a positive
discount rate.
One such argument for a positive discount rate (though not the most im-
portant one) is the claim that a discount rate of zero leads to a reductio ad
absurdum. Partha Dasgupta (2007, p. 6), for example, has shown how low
discount rates would lead to savings rates that are implausibly high. Given
Stern’s low discount rate, one should demand a rate of savings of 97.5% of
all output in an optimal growth model (compare this to the current savings
rate in the UK of about 15% of GDP). The idea of optimal growth models
is to look for a balance between consumption and savings that maximizes
discounted utility over time, where it is assumed that what is saved is in-
vested at a positive rate of return. Another reductio is based on the fact
that humanity potentially exists forever (or for a very long time). Even the
smallest gains to an infinitely large number of future humans might, given a
discount rate of zero, justify even the largest possible sacrifice of the present
generation. Demanding a savings rate of 97.5% or demanding the largest
possible sacrifice from the present generation are both absurd conclusions,
and if the discount rate of zero should actually have such implications, it
surely would have to be dismissed immediately.
But scrutinizing whether it really is the premise of a discount rate of
zero that leads to such a conclusion reveals something crucial. What these
arguments actually point out is that if one aims at maximizing aggregate
utility and if, for that purpose, one weights the utility of present and future
utility equally (i.e. applies a discount rate of zero), then one runs into a
reductio ad absurdum (cf. Caney (2008, p. 549)). But this reductio can
not only be evaded by giving up a discount rate larger than zero, it can
also be evaded by giving up the goal of maximizing aggregate utility. And
this is the route we propose: We should not evaluate policies with effects
20
2.2 Genuine Discounting: Probably Wrong But Above All Unnecessary
over more than one generation by their effect on aggregate utility. Simple
utilitarianism is a theory with few proponents, in particular for judging
issues like climate policy. It is amazing how economists actually did manage
to persuade politicians to see the sum of utility over the next decades and
centuries resulting from, say, the Kyoto Protocol as an important figure in
the decision to support it or not. If one grants that this sum is not very
relevant then the adequate response to the above reductiones ad absurdum
becomes clear: The first conditional is to be rejected and not the second,
i.e. the whole underlying theory of utilitarianism is to be rejected and not
simply the discount rate of zero within utilitarianism. The latter is hardly
the problem (as we did not argue but just briefly suggested in the first
paragraph of this section).
What is an alternative to utilitarianism? It suffices here to sketch in a
completely broad-brush manner the general thrust of a deontological alter-
native. Such an alternative makes a clear distinction between the effects of
a policy that affect the present generation (who decides on the policy) and
those effects that affect future generations. In contrast to utilitarianism,
deontological morality treats the effects of an action completely differently
depending on whether they fall on oneself or on others. Within the confines
of the premises mentioned in the introduction to this chapter – i.e. that
everything of value can be expressed in terms of utility – one plausible way
of spelling out how a deontological alternative to utilitarianism takes fu-
ture generations into account in present-day decision-making requires from
the present generation to bequeath a certain threshold level of utility to
future generations. A theory of intergenerational distributive justice (or a
theory of sustainability) could specify this level in egalitarian terms (say, as
much as the present generation enjoyed) or, more plausibly, in sufficientarian
terms (say, enough to lead a decent or flourishing life) (cf. Meyer and Roser
(2009)) and possibly speak of this level as a right of future generations.
Such a threshold principle is at odds with the utilitarianism of cost-benefit
analysis: If the present generation has set aside enough resources – in the
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form of climate mitigation, capital formation, and so on – for the sake of
future generations such that the latter can reach the required threshold of
utility, the present generation need not concern itself with increasing future
utility any further (though it may of course do so, for example because of
beneficence or because of the warm glow of imagining one’s descendants well
off). If a policy would yield huge benefits to the future at low costs to the
present, the present generation would have no duty to pursue it. Conversely,
if the present generation has not set aside enough resources to lift future
generations above the required threshold of utility, policies that yield only
slight improvements to future generations can be required of the present
generation even if the latter should thereby incur large costs.
As a side remark, note that, in general, this alternative is neither more
lenient nor more demanding towards the present generation than utilitari-
anism. This is worth mentioning because there is sometimes a fear among
defendants of a positive and high discount rate that their opponents might
be environmentalist saints who want to place unrealistically stringent de-
mands on the present generation in arguing against positive discount rates.
Actually, the tables can be turned (cf. Caney (2008, p. 549)): Typically,
in moral philosophy, consequentialism (of which the utilitarianism of cost-
benefit analysis is a species) is seen as having the problem of being unduly
demanding.
What discount rate does this deontological approach involve? The simple
answer is: None at all, not even a rate of zero. For effects that concern
future generations, it does not make a discount rate necessary. It thus re-
buts the claim made by Pearce et al. (2003, p. 124) that “not discounting”
amounts to “discounting at 0%”. Discounting is only necessary if one weighs
up present and future values. As soon as one weighs up values, one needs
to accord weights to these values (with a zero discount rate amounting to
according equal weights). The deontological approach, however, does not
suggest giving “equal weight”. Rather, it proposes not to weigh up the util-
ity of present and future generations at all (and it therefore disagrees with
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the claim by Anthoff et al. (2008, p. 3) that “any statement about the de-
sirability of climate policy necessarily contains a value judgement about the
importance of future gains relative to present sacrifices.” (emphasis added)).
Future generations’ utility is something of which the present generation has
to guarantee a certain amount of, regardless of whether the costs of doing
so exceed the discounted benefits or not. And thus, in the intergenerational
context and according to the deontological framework, the discount rate is
irrelevant.
To reinforce the point, note that, in terms of counterintuitive implications,
proponents of a low discount rate sit in the same boat as proponents of a
high discount rate: If the uneasiness about a high discount rate stems from
the fact that this makes even cataclysmal damages in the future count as
trivial in today’s terms, then one should be almost as uneasy about a low
discount rate because the latter, too, evaluates cataclysmal damages as
trivial in today’s term as long as those damages happen just far enough in
the future. This reveals again that the basic problem about discounting is
the allowance of intergenerational trade-offs and not just the allowance of
intergenerational trade-offs with the wrong weights. In principle, given the
utility maximizing framework, even a zero or a negative discount rate makes
it possible to justify the bequest of catastrophes on posterity.
To sum up this section: The diagnosis is that the whole discounting
debate has gone off track. Those who care about justice being done to
future generations have criticized economists for their high discount rates
and have spent all their energy in arguing for lower discount rates or in
investigating different kinds of sophisticated alternatives such as differential
or hyperbolic discount rates. The correct point on which to attack the
economic approach to climate change, however, is not the magnitude of the
discount rate but rather the utilitarian framework – the framework within
which the necessity of determining a discount rate springs up at all. Note
that a point in this general direction – i.e. that many concerns about the
discount rate would more aptly be captured by criticizing more fundamental
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features of the economic approach than by criticizing the magnitude of the
discount rate – has been made in some form or other by various authors,
including prominent ones like Rawls (1971, pp. 297–98), Parfit and Cowen
(1992, p. 149), Sunstein and Weisbach (2008, p. 7), and Nordhaus (1997,
p. 327). It was succinctly expressed by Ferejohn and Page (1978, p. 274):
Our result suggests that the research for a “fair” rate of discount
is a vain one. Instead of searching for the “right” number, “the”
social rate of discount, we must look to broader principles of
social choice to incorporate ideas of intertemporal equity.
In terms of a disclaimer, it must be admitted that in this section the
contrast between utilitarianism and its deontological counterpart was made
very stark. In a more complete argument one would have to take into ac-
count that also non-utilitarian theories allow or prescribe weighing up some
goods (and possibly even prescribe weighing up rights). And as soon as
weighing up is allowed the question of the discount rate reappears. It reap-
pears in particular when it comes to weighing up utility coming at different
points within the present generation’s own lifespan (this is morally much
less problematic, however, than weighing up goods accruing to different
generations).
2.3 The Opportunity Cost Argument
The conclusion of the last section, however, is not the end of the story as
concerns the discount rate. Even if the above reasoning about the irrelevance
of the discount rate is correct, discounting – or, more precisely, something
that on the surface looks a lot like genuine discounting – still has a legitimate
role to play.
We will distinguish two senses of “discounting” and label the genuine sense
of discounting – discussed in the last section – “Discounting as Weighting”.
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The discount rate in this sense gives weights to utility at different points in
time and values utility according to these weights. “Discounting as Weight-
ing” is done with the purpose of aggregating utility at different points in
time into a single number. The idea of the utilitarian moral theory that
makes such a discount rate necessary is to choose the policy that yields the
highest aggregate discounted utility: How much utility the present genera-
tion bequeaths to posterity is determined by whatever yields the largest sum
of discounted utility. And since this sum depends on what discount rate is
used, the discount rate is also a determinant of how much the present gener-
ation should invest for the sake of posterity. If a low discount rate is chosen,
the present generation will have to forego much utility in order to invest
for the future. If a high discount rate is chosen – and future utility thus
counts for little in the maximization exercise – the present generation must
set aside few resources for future generations.
In this section, another sense of “discounting” that we label “Discounting
as Representing Opportunity Costs” will be discussed (”Opportunity Cost”
is a concept from economics that is defined as the “cost” of foregoing the
best alternative to an option one has chosen).
The quotation marks are supposed to indicate that this is not a genuine
kind of discounting. “Discounting as Representing Opportunity Costs” is
not done with the purpose of determining how much utility the present gen-
eration ought to leave behind for posterity, but rather (given the level it
ought to leave behind) with the purpose of determining by what means util-
ity should be transferred into the future, i.e., whether through investments
into climate mitigation, or through investments into other projects such as
infrastructure, poverty reduction, basic research, etc. All of these different
projects exhibit a certain rate of return. Those projects with a high rate
of return allow the present generation to set aside fewer resources to fulfil
its duties towards posterity (in terms of guaranteeing a certain utility level)
than those projects with a low rate of return. If it is the policymaker’s goal
to fulfil the duty at the lowest possible cost, determining what return on
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investment the different projects have must be investigated. If climate mit-
igation has a lower rate of return than its alternatives, it is not the optimal
project of choice for carrying out one’s duty towards future generations.
In order to determine whether climate mitigation actually is a project
with a lower return than other projects, the policymaker – or the economist
advising him – can perform a mathematical exercise that on the surface looks
exactly like genuine discounting: Assume that a certain climate mitigation
measure costs 5 units today and prevents damages in the magnitude of
100 units in 100 years. One can then look at the most efficient alternative
opportunity for which one could use the 5 units today and determine the
rate of return this alternative investment opportunity has (call the latter
rate of return i). In practice, the return that one can reach on alternative
investments will be derived from the market interest rate (take i = 4% as an
example; note that we are concerned here with a utility interest rate, while
the observable market interest rate is of course in monetary terms). One can
then “discount” future climate damages of the magnitude of 100 by the rate
of i = 4%, and if the discounted damage is smaller than the 5 units necessary
to prevent this climate damage, the climate investment is inefficient and the
same amount of utility for future generations could be achieved in a way
that is cheaper for the present generation, namely by investing into the
project that yields return i. In the current example, discounting 100 units
occurring in 100 years with a rate of 4% would yield a value of less than 2
units and therefore be much smaller than the costs of the climate mitigation
investment. This means that if the 5 units were instead invested at the
market rate of return, they would yield a pay-off of more than 270 units in
100 years, which would count as a much more profitable investment than the
prevention of climate damages. This is all just a roundabout way of making
a basic point that is familiar to any business decision: The internal rate of
return of a project – such as climate mitigation – should exceed a hurdle
rate that reflects the cost of capital. Of course, on a less simplistic view
a host of technicalities such as irreversibilities, uncertainties, etc. would
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enter, but the foundational point remains that in general the capital used
for a project should yield a higher return than its alternative use in order
for the project to be worthwhile.
Presupposing the economic premise of substitutability between different
goods, these kinds of efficiency calculations seem to be a legitimate con-
sideration in judging climate policy. And, these kinds of calculations of
opportunity costs can formally be represented as a discounting operation.
However, in this kind of “discounting” operation no weighting of utility is
involved at all. “Discounting” is only used as a mathematical tool of taking
opportunity cost into account. One could make the whole argument with-
out the notion of “discounting” and only rely on the notion of return on
investment. This kind of discounting is neutral with respect to the founda-
tional theory one employs – utilitarian or deontological – and with respect
to how much utility one ought to bequeath to future generations. This kind
of “non-genuine” discounting is only based on the idea that it is not a suf-
ficient reason for engaging in climate mitigation that one owes something
to posterity and that it is neither a sufficient reason that such mitigation
investments have a positive return. Rather, since the resources that are put
into climate mitigation are not available for other investments, and since
these other investments typically have a positive return, too (and possibly
an even larger one), climate mitigation investments can be said to have an
opportunity cost. And if one is interested in fulfilling one’s duty towards
future generation at the smallest possible cost, this must be taken into ac-
count.
The fact that alternatives to climate mitigation yield large returns when
compounded over decades, too, is something that, in our opinion, is not suf-
ficiently taken notice of outside the discipline of economics. Many criticisms
of discounting by moral philosophers or environmentalists are based on the
intuitive repugnance of discounting: How could it be – so the critics ask,
based on common sense – that the amount of resources deemed worthy of
investing in the prevention of climate damages depends so dramatically on
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the point of time when these damages materialise? How could it possibly
be justifiable that this amount is, say, twenty times smaller if the damages
materialise in 100 years rather than today? The opportunity cost argument
reveals that this is not at all as repugnant as it seems at first sight. In
particular, justifying discounting in this non-genuine sense does not have
to be based on the – indeed morally repugnant or at least questionable –
premise of considering future humans less valuable or giving less weight to
the utility they enjoy.
A question remains, even if it is conceded that “Discounting as Represent-
ing Opportunity Costs” is justified: Is the justifiability of this non-genuine
kind of discounting really independent from the justifiability of the genuine
kind of discounting? It is – but confusion creeps in because there still is
an indirect but harmless way in which opportunity costs depend on people
exhibiting pure time preference, i.e. on people genuinely underweighting
future utility. The opportunity cost of capital that is invested into climate
mitigation can roughly be derived from the market interest rate. The market
interest rate depends on a number of factors. Some of these factors are not
influenced by humans, but others are: If people exhibit a high rate of pure
time preference, i.e. if they discount future benefits and costs heavily, this
is equivalent to a low demand for future goods, which in turn drives interest
rates upwards. So, if people actually are impatient (a descriptive claim),
this can drive up opportunity costs and therefore indirectly make climate
mitigation less recommendable (a normative claim). The important point
to note here is that the legitimacy of taking opportunity costs into account
when deciding on climate policy does not depend on the moral evaluation of
the determinants of the magnitude of these opportunity costs. The market
interest rate that determines the magnitude of opportunity costs might be
high due to selfish and irrational behaviour – which is a description some
would want to give to behaviour driven by pure time preference larger than
zero – but this does not affect the sheer fact that climate investments do
have an opportunity cost of that magnitude (cf. Birnbacher (2003, p. 50)).
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In the language of economic theory, the point can be expressed as fol-
lows: What Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) between present and
future units people’s preferences exhibit – i.e. how they value present com-
pared to future units – is not directly relevant to the discounting question,
or, more precisely, not relevant for the discounting question in the inter-
generational case. In the intergenerational context, the only factor that is
directly relevant is the Marginal Rate of Transformation (MRT) between
present and future units. The MRT expresses the relative price of present
units compared to future units. It is another way of expressing the rate of
return. In a market economy, however, the MRT is not independent of the
MRS – in equilibrium, they are even equal – and so people’s actual future-
regarding preferences do affect, in an indirect way, how we ought to evaluate
future-regarding policies. How we ought to evaluate future-regarding poli-
cies depends on the MRT, and if the MRT is dependent or even equal to
the MRS this can of course mislead one to take the MRS as the basis for
discounting. This mistake is, for example, committed when some authors,
based on a respect for democracy, prescribe a positive discount rate directly
on the basis of people’s actual underweighting of future utility, or when they
prescribe a hyperbolic discount rate directly on the basis of the empirical
fact that people actually exhibit hyperbolic preferences. The primary thing
to do, however, is to note that these attitudes of people affect the rate of
return of capital and therefore the opportunity costs of climate mitigation
– and then to focus on the opportunity costs as the consideration that is
directly relevant.
Recall that the argument for the legitimacy of non-genuine discounting
rests on the premise mentioned in the introduction, namely that all values
can be bundled together in one overarching value (utility), and that there-
fore any kind of investment counts as substitutable for another as long as it
yields the same amount of utility as the other. Many people – both philoso-
phers and non-philosophers – are critical of this premise. If one should,
for example, think that a dollar invested in medical research or economic
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growth has a much higher return than a dollar invested in climate mitiga-
tion or conservation of biodiversity, but if one should also think that medical
progress and economic growth should not be substituted for climatic sta-
bility and biodiversity, then the opportunity cost argument for preferring
investments into medical research and economic growth over climate mitiga-
tion and biodiversity conservation loses all its power. The opportunity cost
argument loses all its power, a fortiori, if one believes that these different
goods are not even commensurable or that there is something deeply wrong
about conceiving of them as “investments” and that it therefore does not
make sense to speak about comparing their returns.
2.4 Implications
What answers do sections 2.2 and 2.3 give to the original question “Should
we discount future utility and if yes, how much?” The answer depends on
what sense of “discounting” is involved and what one uses the discount rate
for.
Discounting in the first sense (cf. section 2.2) is understood in the sense
of weighting, and it is used for the purpose of judging policies by the sum of
weighted utility they bring forth. The appropriate response to this kind of
discounting is to question the goal of maximizing a sum of weighted utility in
the first place, and not only to question how utility at different points in time
is weighted. When policies are judged by this maximization criterion, not
only are the means to benefit future generations judged by their effects on
aggregate utility, but also the distribution of utility among generations. This
is problematic: How much utility the present generation ought to leave to
future generations should be determined by defining a certain level of utility
owed to future generations independently of aggregate considerations, but
rather based on deontological reasoning.
Once one has determined how much the present generation should be-
queath to posterity, one then has to determine by what means the present
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generation should bequeath this amount of utility. To answer this question,
a discount rate may legitimately be used. A discount rate in this sense rep-
resents opportunity costs (cf. section 2.3). Using such a discount rate – and
deriving it from the market interest rate – allows to account for opportunity
costs of climate investments in a mathematically elegant way (even though
it could also formally be done without a discount rate). It is nothing more
than an instrument to compare the returns of different sorts of investments.
In summary, the conclusion is that – at least in the intergenerational con-
text and given the premise of the legitimacy and possibility of substituting
different investments for each other – genuine discounting in the sense of
according weights is not necessary, and non-genuine discounting in the sense
of representing opportunity cost is justified.
How does this conclusion deal with the two concrete questions mentioned
in the introduction? The first question is: Should a climate mitigation
measure be pursued that costs 5 units of utility today and increases utility
in 100 years by 100 units? In one scenario, assume that discounting these 100
units by the rate of return of the best available alternative investment yields
a value of 6 units. In other words, the rate of return on climate investments
is 3% and the rate of return on the best available alternative investments is
2.8%. Should the climate mitigation measure be pursued? Not necessarily.
Whether it should be pursued not only depends on its being more efficient
than alternative projects, but also on whether the measure is necessary
to lift future generations above the threshold level of utility required by
considerations of intergenerational justice. If the present generation has
already set aside enough for posterity, then there is no binding reason to
pursue climate mitigation even if mitigation has a positive net present value.
In another scenario, assume that discounting the 100 units of prevented
damage by the rate of return of the best alternative investment yields a value
of 4 units. In other words, the rate of return on the best available alternative
investment in this scenario is 3.2%. Should the climate measure be pursued
in this case? If the policymaker cares about achieving an intergenerationally
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just policy at the lowest possible cost, the answer is no: If the present
generation owes further utility to future generations, this utility could be
“bought” at a cheaper price if one engaged in the alternative investment
rather than by protecting the climate. This is what discounting (in the
sense of “Discounting as Representing Opportunity Costs”) reveals.
To sum up: The fact that discounted future benefits (where the discount
rate is determined by the return on alternative investments) exceed the
present costs of a given climate policy is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for the policy to be recommendable. This is in contrast to the
typical cost-benefit analyst who would regard it as both a necessary and
sufficient condition.
The second question is: What is the total cost of emitting a ton of CO2 if
its emission leads to a utility loss of 1 unit per year for the next 100 years?
The answer to this question is less clear than is generally recognized by
proponents of discounting. One interpretation of the question is this: How
much would it cost us today to make investments that make everybody as
well off as if the ton of CO2 had not been emitted? In order to answer this
question, the reasoning concerned with non-genuine discounting is relevant:
The damage done in the future must be discounted by the rate of return on
alternative investments that are necessary to counterbalance the utility loss
generated by the emission of CO2. On this interpretation, the total cost of
emitting a ton of CO2 is much less than 100.
A second interpretation, however, takes the question at face value and
simply asks what the costs are (regardless of how they could be counterbal-
anced). The answer to this question corresponds to the reasoning concerning
genuine discounting. If one wants to know the total costs – simpliciter –
there is no reason to discount future costs before adding them up. The total
costs are 100 units and nothing less (even though the costs for counterbal-
ancing these costs of 100 are much less than 100). There is a difficulty with
this second interpretation of the question, however: Why should one be in-
terested in the answer to such a question in the first place? In what way
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are the costs caused by a ton of CO2, aggregated over generations, relevant
to the decision of the present generation on how much CO2 to emit? For
the present generation, what matters primarily are two points: first, that
justice is done to future generations and, second, that justice is done at the
lowest possible cost to itself. Total costs show up in neither of these two
considerations.
How could these conclusions from section 2.2 and 2.3 be incorporated
into the actual models built by climate economists? Cost-benefit analy-
sis that aims at maximizing net present value does not yield answers to
questions we are interested in because picking a policy which results in the
maximal sum of utility across generations is not what we ought to care
about (and it is neither what most people actually do care about). Nei-
ther is the Social Cost of Carbon computed for many decades a number
that contains decision-relevant information. Something closely related to
classical cost-benefit analysis, however, produces relevant results, namely
cost-effectiveness studies (or, similar approaches such as the tolerable win-
dows approach). In such studies that separate the equity and the efficiency
question a certain target is defined, say, an emission concentration or a
temperature threshold (both could be interpreted as a proxy for the utility
level owed to future generations), and then the most efficient path – taking
into account opportunity costs – to reach that target is calculated. Such
an approach makes future utility independent of cost-benefit considerations
and therefore also independent of discounting debates.
2.5 Normative or Descriptive
The literature on discounting is not unanimous about the status of the
debate: Is there a disagreement on a normative or on a descriptive issue?
Some claim that there is something deeply irritating about descriptivists
(cf. Birnbacher (2003, p. 47)), while others deride those calling for moral
argument as arrogant (cf. Nordhaus (2007, p. 691)). Still others speak of
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there being both a descriptive and a prescriptive approach alongside each
other (cf. Arrow et al. (1996)). The crucial question is this: Does one
have to invoke not only descriptive premises but also normative premises in
arguing for the correct view on discounting?
In some very limited sense, one need not invoke normative premises to
choose a discount rate: Anyone can run economic models of climate change
and one can do so for whatever purpose one likes. If that purpose is just
the fun of doing maths or to see what happens when plugging in different
numbers for the discount rate, then the choice of a discount rate obviously
is not a normative matter.
However, economic models of climate change are typically built with a
certain purpose in mind. This purpose consists in helping policymakers
decide on what should be done. “What should be done” – this is an irre-
ducibly normative matter. How, then, does the normativity of the purpose
of the economic model “infect” the choice of the discount rate with nor-
mativity? Economists know that they can neither make a unique model
for every single person that would like to have judged climate policy ac-
cording to his own preferred criteria (including the discount rate), nor can
they explain to policymakers in depth and detail the criteria (including the
discount rate) according to which economic models evaluate climate policy.
In such circumstances, and when forced to decide on which criteria to use
when putting a yardstick to climate policy, using those criteria that would
democratically be chosen seems to be a sensible way to go. And this is how
climate economists often defend the discount rate they use: They claim to
use the discount rate that people would actually plug into their models if
they could do so. Where do they get the information about people’s views
on the discount rate? They claim that the market interest rate mirrors the
preferences of people concerning discounting and is therefore democratically
justified. Many will also claim that reading off the discount rate from the
market interest rate makes the choice of a discount rate a descriptive issue
rather than a normative issue.
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In response to these claims, we have two remarks: First, even if the ob-
served market interest rate should figure somewhere in the premises of the
argument for the correct discount rate to be used, this does not by itself
make the choice of the discount rate a purely descriptive issue. There are
other premises left, and at least one of them is a normative one: The premise
that in economic modelling one should use those criteria – such as the mag-
nitude of the discount rate – that people would democratically approve of.
Even if this premiss about democracy is not a very controversial premiss,
it still is a normative premise. It is a premise relating to the professional
ethics of modellers who know that policymakers listen to them without be-
ing able to completely understand their models. Second, we go along with
the idea that economic policy advice should work with the criteria that peo-
ple would democratically approve of. But we find it extremely implausible
to claim that one can read off how presently living people would like to treat
people living in the future from market interest rates. This assumes that
presently living people not only maximize discounted utility over their own
lifetime but that this maximizing framework is also what they would like
to apply to the utility of future generations. A much more reliable way of
finding out how people want to incorporate the effects of policies on future
generation’s utility in their action guiding principles is to start reflecting on
how one would do that oneself, to discuss the results with moral philoso-
phers, social scientists, and psychologists and, most importantly (though
most expensively) to engage in surveys.
So far we have argued the following in this section: For the economist who
is involved in modelling, the choice of the discount rate is normative but it
is only normative in the very limited sense of presupposing the normative
premise that one should use those criteria that the democratic body would
approve of. Once he has decided on this normative premise, he is then only
involved in the descriptive issue of finding out what the democratic body
thinks about discounting.
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But matters are different for the democratic body itself. For the demo-
cratic body, the discount rate is a more substantively normative issue. If
people have to decide on how future generations ought to be treated, nor-
mativity can in no way be stripped off from this “ought”. They cannot rely
on what the democratic body thinks because they are the democratic body
itself. Depending on how people want future generations to be treated,
they have to tell their scientists what kind of numbers to calculate: Either
numbers that inform them about the sum of discounted utility of various
policies (and if so, with how high a discount rate), or numbers that portray
the costs of different policies that all bequeath a certain pre-defined level of
utility to future generations, or still other numbers that are only relevant
when one is interested in laying still another normative yardstick to policy.
It is of course granted that once these normative questions on how future
generations’ utility ought to be taken into account are decided, there still
remain a host of descriptive issues to be looked at, not the least of which
is the use of the market interest rate as a proxy for the opportunity cost of
capital.
2.6 The Roots of Confusion
The debate on discounting has brought forth a lot of puzzlement and per-
plexity. This can be traced to at least three features of the issue.
First, since discounting is concerned with future generations, it is con-
cerned with justice among an indefinite and potentially infinite number of
individuals. Neither our theories of justice nor our human thinking, more
generally, is adapted to deal with infinity. Our minds are already bad at
handling very large numbers and infinity is something completely different
still. Since the underlying utilitarianism involved in cost-benefit analysis is
interested in maximizing the sum of individuals’ utility up into the indefinite
or infinite future, our human inability to grasp and deal with such concepts
should not be taken lightly.
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Second, real people actually do discount within their own lifetime: They
aim at increasing the sum of utility over time, but give less weight to utility
when it accrues in the future than when it accrues in the present. This em-
pirical fact poses a difficult problem for the discounting debate on intergen-
erationally relevant policy choices. First, it is a difficult question whether
such discounting in personal choices within one’s own lifetime should be
thought of as irrational (after all, utility that we receive in the future is just
as much utility as when we receive it in the present) or whether it should
simply be seen as a matter of taste to prefer utility in the present to utility
in the future (after all, what is so different about preferring apples over
oranges to preferring utility today over utility tomorrow?). A particularly
strong, though not conclusive, case can be made that hyperbolic discount-
ing must count as irrational since it leads to time inconsistency. Second,
it is unclear in what way considering discounting within one’s own lifetime
to be legitimate should affect how one views the legitimacy of discounting
in policies with effects beyond one’s own lifetime. This is particularly so
because, whereas for each individual there is a clear distinction between its
own lifetime and people living or being born after its lifetime, for society
(the “present generation”) as a whole (and it is society as a whole that
decides on policies) there is no such distinction.
Third, there is something deeply “magical” about the fact that invest-
ments have a positive rate of return (or worded differently: that “capital is
productive” (Gosseries (2008, p. 66)) or that “technology is fertile” (Broome
(1994, p. 139))). This familiar and obvious fact is the most unrecognized
but most powerful cause of puzzlement inherent in the discounting debate.
If we plant one apple today an apple tree will grow and we will have more
than one apple in the future. Apples increase over time. As a consequence
of this, it becomes a genuinely philosophical issue whether two apples today
should be seen as equally valuable as two apples in the future. Even though
we are talking about the same amount of the same good (only at different
points in time), two apples today are in some sense more valuable than two
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apples in the future. The reason is that if one owns the two apples today,
rather than in the future, one can plant one of the two apples and eat the
other and therefore have more apples both today (one apple instead of zero)
and in the future (say, three apples instead of two) than if one had the two
apples only in the future. The paradox in the claim that two apples can be
more valuable than two apples is rooted in the fact that this claim, as used
in ordinary talk, does not specify whether the two apples in question are
consumed or owned. Consuming two apples is indeed equally valuable today
and tomorrow. Owning two apples is not – due to the possibility of “invest-
ing” them profitably. The same holds true not only for apples but for many
investments, and also indirectly for utility. Foregoing utility today implies
the ability to harvest more utility in the future than the amount foregone
today. That is the opposite of a leaky bucket, it is an “incubation bucket”,
so to speak (cf. Schelling (1995, p. 398)). And our theories of distribu-
tive justice have not, in general, dealt with the issue of values that increase
when being “redistributed”, and in particular not with the potential – given
the open future – to increase indefinitely (for an interesting exception, see
Moeller (2006)).
These three factors taken together, and in particular the last one, explain
some of the difficulty in coming to terms with the discount rate.
38
3 Rights-Sensitivity and Risk-Aversion
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the link between rights and risk-aversion. The risk-
aversion of a rights-sensitive decision-maker is based not only on the con-
cavity of the utility function but also on how the utilities of other agents
enter his choice problem. Compared to a utilitarian decision-maker he thus
has additional reasons for risk-aversion.
The link between rights and risk-aversion is especially relevant for top-
ics such as climate policy. In the climate policy arena there is a loud and
persistent voice which demands risk-aversion beyond the justifications of
standard economics. This voice – manifesting itself in calls for the applica-
tion of a precautionary principle – has not often made its case in precise and
coherent terms. But since the vague intuition on which it is based (“better
safe than sorry”) is very powerful, it is worthwhile to seek ways of making
its message clearer and giving it a sounder rationale than it has been given
so far. We claim that replacing the utilitarianism of standard economics by
a rights-sensitive approach to policy choice yields such a rationale.
In order to support this claim, we propose three stylized ways of capturing
the logic of rights within a formal model. All three alternative versions
reveal the basic reason why rights imply risk-aversion: Violating a right
constitutes a large downside risk while “overfulfilling” a right constitutes
no comparable upside risk. This asymmetry is responsible for the kind of
risk-aversion incorporated in rights-sensitive but not in standard economic
models.
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In the background of this chapter is the fact that climate policy has given
new prominence to questions of intertemporal distribution. Engaging in
such policies as emission reductions is costly for the present generation but
benefits mainly future generations. What criterion should be used to judge
policies which affect the intertemporal distribution of costs and benefits? In
addition to the issue of intertemporal distribution, climate policy has also
given new importance to the issue of uncertainty. There is large scientific
uncertainty about the long-term effects of our current climate policies. Con-
tinuing with the current level of emissions might bequeath anything from
small costs to catastrophic harm to our descendants. In what manner should
the extent of uncertainty affect policy choice?
Climate economics and its underlying utilitarianism have a standard way
of dealing both with the issue of intertemporal distribution and with the
issue of uncertainty. The intertemporal distribution resulting from a given
policy is evaluated in terms of efficiency, i.e. in terms of whether it in-
creases “the size of the pie”. The uncertain effects associated with a given
policy are evaluated in terms of their expected utility. Both, this approach
to intertemporal distribution and this approach to uncertainty, are faced
with criticism. Many claim that intertemporal distribution should not only
be judged in terms of efficiency but also in terms of equity, i.e. in terms
of how “the pie is split up”. In particular, since distribution across time
concerns not only future points of time within our own life but affects also
our descendants, rights of future generations to a certain slice of the pie
should be taken into account. The approach to uncertainty is criticized for
downplaying the relevance of uncertainty.9
9 Various authors on the precautionary principle choose economic theory (or slightly
broader or narrower theories such as expected utility theory or cost-benefit analysis)
as the benchmark compared to which a precautionary principle demands something
different (cf. Sandin (2004, p. 6); Gardiner (2006a, p. 35); Sunstein (2005, p. 351).
In terms of an interesting contrast to this literature, the Stern Review (2007, p. 38)
already conceives of classical risk aversion as representing a (narrow) precautionary
principle). Note that there are also many attempts within a standard economic
framework which aim at incorporating our intuitive sense that the uncertainty asso-
ciated with climate change may be more relevant than it seems at first sight. Prime
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This chapter claims that there is a link between these two criticisms of
the standard economic approach: Evaluating intertemporal distributions
not only in terms of the sum of utility but also in terms of whether rights of
future generations are fulfilled yields a particular reason for risk-aversion. If
one finds fault with simply adding up utility across points of time (weighted
by a discount factor) one also has a reason to find fault with simply adding
up utility across states of nature (weighted by their respective probability).
In a nutshell, the basic idea why a concern with rights is linked to risk-
aversion is the following. Rights involve a threshold – a reference point –
below which they are violated and above which they are overfulfilled. The
logic of rights involves a resistance to trade off a probability of violating a
right with a probability of overfulfilling a right. In other words: A right to
𝑥 is not in general fulfilled by the expectation of 𝑥. Even a large probability
of bequeathing more to our descendants than we owe them can often not
make up for a small probability of bequeathing less than we owe them. In an
uncertain context, the central concern for rights thinking is therefore not the
average outcome but rather the avoidance of the downside risk of violating
rights. This asymmetry inherent to rights is responsible for risk-aversion.
The chapter is structured as follows. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 are concerned
with the preliminary task of capturing rights in a formal model. Section 3.2
introduces the outline of the model. Section 3.3 first portrays the utilitarian
decision-maker of standard economics as a benchmark. Second, after a
subsection on the logic of rights – which is more philosophical in outlook and
which can be skipped by readers not interested in this foundation – three
alternative versions of modelling the choice problem of a rights-sensitive
decision-maker are presented. Section 3.4 is concerned with the task of
proving and discussing how a rights-sensitive decision-maker (on any of the
three versions from section 3.3) is risk-averse and is so on additional grounds
compared to a utilitarian decision-maker. Section 3.5 concludes.
examples are Weitzman (2009), Gollier and Treich (2003), or Kuntz-Duriseti (2004);
see also Tol (2003).
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3.2 The Model
We will work with the following model: There are two generations 𝑖 = 1, 2
representing the present and the (non-overlapping) future generation. Util-
ity 𝑈𝑖 of generation 𝑖 represents 𝑖’s wellbeing and depends on its consump-
tion 𝑐𝑖. Consumption is to be understood broadly enough to include any-
thing which yields wellbeing. The utility function 𝑈 is assumed to be the
same for both generations: 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈(𝑐𝑖). Consumption 𝑐2 of the future
generation is a random variable distributed according to a cumulative dis-
tribution function 𝐹2. The expectation of a given 𝐹2 is 𝜇2. The variance,
which represents the extent of uncertainty about future consumption, is 𝜎22 .
Consumption 𝑐1 of the present generation is assumed to be non-random.
The future and the present generation generation are both assumed to have
a right to a utility level of at least 𝑈 . The consumption which corresponds
to 𝑈 in a state of certainty (i.e. 𝜎22 = 0) is denoted by 𝑐. We assume that
there is always at least one feasible combination (𝑐1, 𝐹2) in the choice set for
which it is true that 𝑈(𝑐1) ≥ 𝑈 and 𝐸[𝑈(𝑐2)] ≥ 𝑈 . This is the only assump-
tion we make about the set of feasible combinations of (𝑐1, 𝐹2). The present
generation is the decision-maker who must decide on the policy which will
affect both generations. It must choose one element from the the choice
set of feasible combinations (𝑐1, 𝐹2). It does so by solving a choice problem
which has 𝑈(𝑐1) and 𝑈(𝑐2) as its arguments.
The idea behind this setup is the following. When the present generation
chooses a particular probability distribution over future consumption, 𝐹2,
along with a certain level of present consumption, 𝑐1, it faces a trade-off
between the levels of 𝑐1, 𝜇2 and 𝜎
2
2 . The trade-off between 𝑐1 and 𝜇2 can
be seen as exemplifying the classical consumption-savings-decision. Saving
little means bequeathing little to the future, consuming little means be-
queathing much to the future. Investments – into climate policy but also
more traditional investments – for the sake of increasing the expected con-
sumption of future generations is no free lunch for the present generation.
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The trade-off between 𝜇2 and 𝜎
2
2 can be seen as exemplifying the choice
between different types of investments for the sake of future generations.
Given a certain 𝑐1, some investments bequeath a comparatively low 𝜎
2
2 and
a comparatively low 𝜇2 to future generations while other investments be-
queath a comparatively high 𝜎22 and a comparatively high 𝜇2. In the present
context the following example is particularly salient. Investments into rad-
ical mitigation policies yield a low 𝜎22 for future generations. However, this
reduction in uncertainty delivered by mitigation policies comes at a price.
If the money used for radical mitigation policies were instead employed for
investments into alternative policies – say, strategies which put more weight
on adaptation, economic growth and poverty reduction – this would yield a
somewhat higher 𝜇2 for future generations but it would do so at the expense
of a higher 𝜎22 . The purpose of this chapter is to examine the particular rea-
sons a rights-sensitive decision-maker has for keeping 𝜎22 low.
3.2.1 A Note on Utility
In the literature, the term “utility” is sometimes used for representing the
wellbeing of an agent. At other times, it is used for representing the max-
imand of an agent. It is important, however, not to conflate these two
meanings.10 One should not assume a priori that agents must maximize
10 The latter interpretation – utility as the maximand – is the more official inter-
pretation in decision theory and economics. The former interpretation – utility as
wellbeing –, however, is omnipresent, too, particularly in informal talk as well as in
the field of applied economics where utility is often modelled as a function of only
such factors as can be assumed to affect wellbeing (such as wealth, climate damages,
etc.). In experimental economics, the former interpretation (in a slightly narrower
meaning than presented here) also goes under the heading of “experienced utility”
while the latter interpretation goes under the heading of “decision utility” (see Kah-
neman (2000, p. 673)). The gap between the two interpretations of “utility” is also
revealed in the introduction of the terminology of “instantaneous utility” (or “felic-
ity”). Instantaneous utility stands for utility at a particular point in time. If utility
(or social welfare) as a weighted sum of instantaneous utilities is to be maximized,
then the unqualified use of utility in the first part of the sentence represents the
interpretation of utility as the quantity to be maximized while the use of utility in
“instantaneous utilities” obviously does not represent an intepretation of utility as
a quantity to be maximized (otherwise instantaneous utility would not be weighted
by discount factors).
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their wellbeing. Even if wellbeing is understood in line with the broadest
(but still substantive) sense of the term, i.e. in the sense of what it is for
a life to go well for an agent, the wellbeing of an agent and the maximand
of an agent can diverge. The analogous holds true for the notion of “so-
cial welfare”: Here, too, we must not assume a priori that the aggregate
wellbeing of society (social welfare) must coincide with the function that a
decision-maker in the role of a policy-maker must maximize.
In order to keep the two meanings apart for this chapter, we declare that
we understand the utility of an agent strictly in the sense of his wellbeing
and social welfare as the sum of individual wellbeing. The maximand of
a decision-maker will figure in this chapter as an element of his “choice
problem”. The notion of a choice problem has the advantage of being a
broader and less ambiguous concept than a utility function or social welfare
function.
3.3 Rights-Sensitive Decision-Makers
In this section, we describe the choice problem which a rights-sensitive
decision-maker solves. But first, in terms of the contrasting benchmark,
we present the choice problem which the utilitarian decision-maker solves
and which is often espoused by standard economics for such purposes as
evaluating climate policy.11 Utilitarianism maximizes aggregate expected
utility:
max
𝑐1,𝐹2
(𝑈1 + 𝐸[𝑈2])
subject to the technological constraint that the chosen (𝑐1, 𝐹2) is in the
11 One could equally well contrast rights thinking to similar but slightly broader or nar-
rower theories than utilitarianism which go under such labels as consequentialism,
expected utility theory, traditional decision theory, cost-benefit analysis, etc. Rights
thinking, too, could be portrayed as being equivalent to, close to or part of such the-
ories as deontological, duty-based and Kantian ethics, liberalism and libertarianism,
theories of justice, or decision-making with sacred or protected values.
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choice set (we will henceforth presuppose this technological constraint with-
out mention). For simplicity’s sake, we assume a discount rate of zero (we
discuss discounting in section 3.4.3). Such a decision-maker exhibits risk-
aversion with respect to 𝑐2 whenever the utility function is strictly concave.
The contrasting perspective of rights-sensitive policy choice will be char-
acterized, first, verbally and philosophically in section 3.3.1 and, second,
more formally in section 3.3.2.
3.3.1 The Logic of Rights
For the purpose of this chapter, we define a rights-sensitive decision-maker in
a minimal sense: Any decision-maker counts as rights-sensitive who solves
a choice problem which evaluates the protection of rights favourably and
which does so independently of any instrumental value of rights. This min-
imal characterization already excludes utilitarianism from genuine rights
thinking. The following five (and partly overlapping) aspects characterize
the logic of rights a bit further. In the very general form in which these
features outline rights thinking most people are rights-sensitive to some de-
gree.
Separateness of Persons. Utilitarianism envisages society, metaphori-
cally speaking, as a large “super-person” whose utility ought to be max-
imized whereas rights thinking can be characterized as taking the “sep-
arateness of persons” seriously.12 Individual agents may legitimately be
concerned with their own affairs in their choices rather than giving society
as a whole the same consideration. This sphere of legitimate prioritization
of their own concerns has strict limits, however, in that individuals must
respect the rights of all other individuals. In an agent’s choice problem,
12 See Rawls (1971, p. 27). Note that in this chapter the contrast between single
agents or decision-makers on the one hand and society as whole on the other hand is
exemplified by the contrast between a single generation and both generations taken
together.
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therefore, the maximization of aggregate utility can be trumped by the pri-
ority of both, the agent’s own concerns and the rights of others.13
Agent-Relativity. According to utilitarianism, every agent ought to sol-
ve the same choice problem and every agent enters this common choice
problem in the same way. Rights thinking, in contrast, employs an agent-
relative choice problem into which the concerns of others enter in a different
manner than the agent’s own concerns.
Non-Consequentialism. Utilitarianism advises choosing whatever has
the best consequences. Rights thinking disagrees with this ideal and the
way it disagrees can be captured in two different ways. According to the
first (and more traditional) conceptualization of rights thinking, something
can speak for or against a choice independently of its consequences, namely
whether the chosen act constitutes a rights violation or not. According to
the second (and less traditional) conceptualization, the protection of rights
is itself seen as a type of good consequence. In contrast to utilitarianism,
however, agents ought not necessarily to aim at the best consequences if
best is understood in an agent-neutral sense. If we assume, for example,
that an agent has stronger reason not to commit a rights violation himself
than to prevent the same rights violation committed by somebody else then
we admit that rights violations, understood as consequences, do not enter
an agent’s choice problem in proportion to their (agent-neutral) value. For
a detailed treatment of these issues, see Sen (1982).
Resistance to Trade-Offs. Utilitarianism allows trade-offs between any
two goods of equal value. Rights thinking, in contrast, exhibits a certain
resistance to trade-offs. In the extreme, it exhibits an absolute prohibition
of certain trade-offs, i.e. it prioritizes the fulfillment of rights to such a
degree that no value could weigh up a rights violation. Rights can thus be
13 The latter feature also distinguishes rights thinking from egoism. While both, rights
thinking and egoism, do not demand from agents to take up the perspective of an
impersonal social planner, it is only the former which sets certain bounds – grounded
in the concerns of other agents – to the maximization of an agent’s own utility.
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seen as “sacred values” or “protected values” (cf. Baron and Spranca (1997)
or Tanner et al. (2007)).
Thresholds. Utilitarianism’s choice problem is a smooth function of the
utilities that enter into it. Rights thinking, in contrast, involves thresholds
(cf. for example Caney (2009)). Up to the threshold where rights are ful-
filled, an agent must give precedence to the concerns of others. Beyond that
threshold, the concerns of others do not have to take on much importance
for an agent. Agents can take a “satisficing” approach towards the concerns
of others, so to speak.
One should not be misled to distinguish rights thinking from utilitarian-
ism by holding the former to be more demanding, for example by assuming
that in the intergenerational context a rights respecting policy objective
necessarily places greater burdens on the present generation than a utili-
tarian approach (cf. Caney (2008, p. 549)). One should neither conflate
respect for rights with other motives for taking the concerns of others into
account. In the literature on bequests (cf. Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) and
Masson and Pestieau (1997)), for example, altruistic motives (wanting ones
children to be well off), exchange motives (expecting something in return
from ones offspring) or “egoistic” motives (enjoying giving) all lead to be-
queathing something to posterity. Bequeathing something out of a respect
for the rights of our descendants, however, is a motive still different. One
can give out of a respect for rights without exhibiting beneficence in the
sense of genuinely wanting the receiver to be well off, without expecting
something in return and without the “warm glow” of giving.
The specific example of a right employed here – a right to 𝑈 – should
be seen as a strong simplification for the purpose of exploring the general
logic of rights, in particular of rights ascribed by a theory of intergenera-
tional distributive justice.14 Such a theory could specify the level of 𝑈 in
14 The right to a certain wellbeing level is chosen here because it links up most seam-
lessly with traditional economic ways of formalizing utilitarianism while still exhibit-
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egalitarian terms (making 𝑈 equal to or at least dependent on 𝑈1) or, more
plausibly, in non-relative, sufficientarian terms (ascribing, for example, a
human right to subsistence, or a right – in the words of the famous Brundt-
land definition of sustainability – to the ability to meet one’s needs, or even
less minimal rights) (cf. Meyer and Roser (2009)). Both represent widely
shared intuitions and express the idea that whereas we do not have a duty
to sacrifice one unit of our own wellbeing whenever this increases future
wellbeing (possibly discounted) by more than a unit, our descendants do
have a right to be left with enough or equally much as we have. Since there
are a number of theorists who are skeptical of rights language when it comes
to future generations but who are much less hesitant to speak of duties or
obligations with respect to future generations – such as a duty to guarantee
basic needs or to avoid deprivation –, it is important to note that duties
often involve the same characteristics as rights (as presented above) and
can therefore also be analyzed within the present framework. A number of
concrete policies which are concerned with not exceeding certain thresholds
in the future can also be framed as having the same structure as policies
which ascribe a right to future generations to 𝑈 , for example the objective
of the European Union to ensure that temperature increase stay below the
2∘C threshold, the objective of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change to avoid crossing the threshold where there is “dangerous interfer-
ence with the climate system” or the precautionary approach in principle 15
of the Rio Declaration which makes reference to the threshold where there
ing the basic features that distinguish a rights-sensitive from a utilitarian decision-
maker. The right to 𝑈 could, however, equally well exemplify some basic features of
more complex rights, such as fundamental human rights, rights of non-human na-
ture, rights ascribed by a theory of intergenerational justice but with a richer metric
than utility, or legally codified rights.
One could also model such more general rights more explicitly. This could be done
by including a variable 𝑅 in the choice problem. Rights would count as fulfilled when
𝑅 takes the value 𝑅. Typically, achieving 𝑅 would have to be modelled as being
costly. One could imagine various models, in particular one could model 𝑅 as only
taking one value below 𝑅 (in case the right cannot be violated more or less gravely)
or as taking no value above 𝑅 (in case there is no sense in which the right can be
overfulfilled).
48
3.3 Rights-Sensitive Decision-Makers
is “serious or irreversible damage” to the environment.
3.3.2 Formalizing Rights
In this section, the choice problem of a rights-sensitive decision maker will
be expressed in a formal way. The model we are looking for has to capture
how a rights-sensitive decision-maker – in contrast to a utilitarian decision-
maker – takes the concerns of others into account in a different way from his
own concerns: Up to the threshold where rights are fulfilled, the concerns of
others take precedence over his own concerns – even if this should decrease
aggregate utility. Beyond the threshold his own concerns take precedence
over those of others – even if this should decrease aggregate utility. The
formalism of the following sections can be used to represent any kind of
policy choice based on this logic, whether couched in terms of rights or not.
It is, however, most naturally interpreted for the case of a right to a certain
utility level based on considerations of distributive justice.
Three alternative versions which represent the logic of rights in different
ways are presented: The Side Constraint Model, the Penalty Model and the
Concavity Model. The reason for discussing three alternative versions lies in
the fact that it is not at all uncontroversial how to capture the subtle logic
of rights. And since we are ultimately interested in examining the claim
that rights imply risk aversion we show that different ways of capturing the
above mentioned features of rights thinking all serve to show the link to
risk-aversion.
The Side Constraint Model
In a world of certainty (𝜎22 = 0), a straightforward way of representing the
essence of rights models them as side constraints:
max𝑈1
s.t. 𝑈𝑖 ≥ 𝑈.
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Increasing 𝑈2 is given complete precedence over the maximization of 𝑈1
until 𝑈2 reaches the threshold of 𝑈 . When that threshold is reached, in-
creasing 𝑈1 is given complete precedence over increasing 𝑈2. Ascribing such
lexical priority to the right of future generations satisfies all of the above
mentioned features of rights thinking.
Difficulties enter, however, when this rights-sensitive choice problem is
extended to the case of uncertainty. How should the side constraint be
modified if 𝑈2 is a random variable? Future generations are owed 𝑈 but
what the present generation can influence is only the probability distribution
over 𝑈2 rather than the actual 𝑈2. The situation of the present generation
with respect to the future generation is similar to someone who owes you
$10 but only has lottery tickets rather than money at hand. What kind
of lottery ticket would count as that person having payed back his debt to
you (without being able to ask for your agreement)? We now present five
suggestions for generalizing the side constraint to the context of uncertainty.
The last of these five suggestions will be deemed satisfactory and will be
labelled the “Side Constraint Model”.
Firstly, the absoluteness associated with the right to 𝑈 in a world of
certainty might suggest that in a world of uncertainty there is a duty to
push the probability of 𝑈2 falling below 𝑈 down to zero. This suggestion is
a non-starter, however: Pushing this probability down to zero may either
be impossible or else imply burdens for the present generation which are so
high as to involve trade-off resistance to an implausibly extreme extent.
Secondly, and for the same reasons, the side constraint cannot be mod-
elled as a duty to minimize the probability of the future generation falling
below 𝑈 . While some policy proposals in the real world admittedly use the
language of minimizing the probability of outcomes such as catastrophic
climate change, this language cannot be taken literally in cases where this
probability could be brought ever closer to zero at ever larger costs.
Thirdly, and slightly more promising, one might have the intuition that
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if the future generation is owed 𝑈2 ≥ 𝑈 in a world of certainty, it is owed
𝐸[𝑈2] ≥ 𝑈 in a world of uncertainty. Richard Howarth’s proposal for “sus-
tainability under uncertainty”, for example, involves this idea.15
The problem with this approach, however, is that a right to 𝑥 cannot in
general be fulfilled by the expectation of 𝑥. A particularly clear example is
given by the following thought experiment. Assume that a psychotic plays a
strange game without your permisssion: He throws a coin and if head comes
up, he will steal $5 from you and if tail comes up he will put $50 in your
mailbox. Even though the game yields an expected gain of more than $20
for you, your rights make it impermissible for the psychotic to carry out this
game. His duty consists in not stealing from you rather than in not stealing
from you on average. The logic of rights does not allow in a straightforward
way to weigh up potential rights violations with potential “supererogatory”
outcomes (i.e. those outcomes which benefit others by going beyond one’s
duty).
Still, this third view contains a grain of truth. While a side constraint to
the effect that 𝐸[𝑈2] ≥ 𝑈 may not be sufficient for the present generation to
respect the rights of future generations it seems at least necessary. We will
assume in the rest of this chapter that any plausible version of formalizing
the choice problem of a rights-sensitive decision-maker incorporates a side
constraint to this effect. The three versions to be discussed will only be con-
cerned with what it is that rights imply additionally to the side constraint
that 𝐸[𝑈2] ≥ 𝑈 .
A fourth approach towards generalizing the side constraint to the context
of uncertainty translates the right to 𝑈 into a duty to keep the probability
of falling below 𝑈 sufficiently small, i.e. smaller than some given parameter.
The parameter would have to be smaller than 0.5 because already the third
15 Howarth (1995, p. 422) suggests that a “deontological approach” to intergenera-
tional fairness (something very close to what we labelled rights thinking), implies
maximizing with a side constraint where the side constraint demands that welfare
at time 𝑡 not exceed welfare at 𝑡+ 1. In order to generalize his approach to risk, he
suggests that the side constraint must be translated into the demand that expected
welfare at 𝑡 not exceed expected welfare at 𝑡+ 1.
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approach demands – at least in the case of a symmetric distribution of 𝑈2
– that the probability of falling below 𝑈 be less than 0.5.
Something analogous is for example suggested by Krysiak and Krysiak
(2006, pp. 516–17) in their own model of sustainability under conditions
of uncertainty. This fourth approach is also in line with the language of
many real world policy discussions. The Greenhouse Development Rights
Framework (see Baer et al. (2008)), for example, takes the goal of limiting
temperature increase to 2∘ as a goal to stay below 2∘ with a probability of
70-85%.
The problem of the fourth approach is its exclusive focus on the prob-
ability of falling below the rights threshold without at all taking note of
how much the future generation might fall below the threshold. Particu-
larly in the case of climate policy where catastrophes and thick tails are an
important issue (cf. Weitzman (2009)), taking note of the shape of the dis-
tribution below the threshold is crucial. Not all rights violation are equally
grave.
The fifth and final approach differs from the fourth suggestion by weight-
ing rights violations by their graveness.16 What must be sufficiently small,
i.e. smaller than some given parameter, is the probability of violating rights
multiplied by the average graveness of rights violations.17 We conceive of the
average graveness of a rights violation as the expected utility shortfall from
the threshold level which is owed to the future generation.18 Some people
16 By making the analogy to financial risk measures, we could say that the fourth
approach suffers from similar shortcomings in comparison to the fifth approach as
the Value at Risk does in comparison to the Conditional Value at Risk. Note also
that in terms of their mathematical structure, the fourth and the fifth approach –
including the variations of the fifth approach mentioned in fn. 18 – are special cases
of lower partial moments.
17 According to Jensen (2002, p. 46), part of the interpretation of the precautionary
principle by the Commission of the European Communities (2000) can be understood
along these (or similar) lines, viz. that a risky action is unacceptable if the severity
of harm multiplied by the probability of harm exceeds some threshold.
18 A further development of the Side Constraint Model might also consider giving
disproportionate weight to large rights violations rather than weighting rights viola-
tions linearly according to their distance from the utility threshold. It could either
overweight or underweight large rights violations. The latter could – in accordance
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use the term “risk” in the sense of the probability of a bad event multiplied
by the magnitude of the bad event, and in that sense the Side Constraint
Model demands nothing else than a sufficiently small risk of rights viola-
tions. It formalizes the choice problem of a rights-sensitive decision-maker
as follows (where 𝛽 is a normatively determined parameter):
The Side Constraint Model
max𝑈1
s.t.
∫ 𝑐
−∞
(𝑈 − 𝑈(𝑐2)) 𝑑𝐹2 ≤ 𝛽
s.t. 𝐸[𝑈𝑖] ≥ 𝑈
By modelling the right of the future generation in terms of a side con-
straint the Side Constraint Model captures something essential about our
rights thinking: The concerns of others do not enter our decision as some-
thing merely to be given a certain weight – regardless of whether that be
equal or less weight than our own concerns – but the concerns of others
enter our decision in a fundamentally different way than our own concerns.
Up to the point where the side constraints – i.e. the rights of others – are
fulfilled, the concerns of others trump our own concerns whereas in the “su-
pererogatory territory” of a fulfilled side constraint our own concerns trump
those of others.
There are, however, also problems to the Side Constraint Model. One
problem – of a rather practical nature – is that it does not link up very
naturally with existing economic models of intertemporal allocation which
add up present and future utility and maximize the sum. The logic of the
Side Constraint Model which relegates the future generation’s utility into a
side constraint is very discontinuous to this approach. A second and more
with the idea of trade-off resistance – be justified by the idea that a rights-sensitive
approach is mainly concerned with whether rights are violated and only to a smaller
extent with whether they are violated gravely or not.
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fundamental problem is the following. While the the Side Constraint Model
does justice to all of the above mentioned features of rights-sensitivity it
does “too much justice” to the feature of trade-off resistance. By giving lex-
ical priority to keeping the risk of rights violation smaller than 𝛽, the Side
Constraint Model is extreme. Most people view at least some rights viola-
tions as permissible (in which case they may be called rights infringements
rather than rights violations (cf. Thomson (1986))). The permissibility de-
pends inter alia on what is gained thereby (cf. McCarthy (1997, p. 209)).
It is a perennial problem both to common sense and to moral philosophy
to come up with a coherent account of rights which is neither implausibly
rigorous in making rights “too” stringent nor embarks on a slippery slope to
utilitarianism in making them not stringent enough. We cannot find a con-
clusion to this perennial tension here. What can be concluded, however, is
that the Side Constraint Model lies too much on the former (stringent) end
of the scale. In being exclusively concerned with a sufficiently low “down-
side risk” for the future generation, the Side Constraint Model takes into
account neither the costs to the present generation of limiting the risk of
rights violation down to 𝛽 nor the foregone “upside potential” for the future
generation. In other words: If it were possible to increase either the utility
of the present generation or the expected utility of the future generation
tremendously by exceeding 𝛽 by an extremely small amount, this would be
ruled out by the Side Constraint Model. It is therefore valuable to sketch
two versions which make rights less stringent.
The Penalty Model
The Penalty Model links up with the standard utilitarian choice problem
in including the utilities of all generations in the maximand of the choice
problem. In addition to the utilities, however, it also includes the fulfillment
of rights in the maximand. Formally, what enters the maximand besides 𝑈1
is a transformation 𝑉2 of the utility function 𝑈2 which involves a penalty
𝛾 > 0 for utility below 𝑈 (see figure 1 below):
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𝑉2 =
{
𝑈2 − 𝛾 if 𝑈2 < 𝑈 ;
𝑈2 if 𝑈2 ≥ 𝑈.
It formalizes the choice problem of a rights-sensitive decision-maker as fol-
lows:
The Penalty Model
max (𝑈1 + 𝐸[𝑉2])
s.t. 𝐸[𝑈𝑖] ≥ 𝑈
This can also be written as:
max
(
𝑈1 + 𝐸[𝑈2]− 𝛾
∫ 𝑐
−∞
𝑑𝐹2
)
s.t. 𝐸 [𝑈𝑖] ≥ 𝑈.
U2
V2
U
?
Figure 1
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Judging the merits of the Penalty Model amounts exactly to the oppo-
site of the Side Constraint Model. While the Side Constraint Model is not
aligned with standard economics, the Penalty Model is much more so (ex-
cept for the non-differentiability of the function 𝑉2). And while the Side
Constraint Model is too stringent with respect to trade-off resistance, the
Penalty Model is too lax. It is too lax because any full-blown rights theory
is less crude in its resistance to trade-offs than simply attaching a disvalue
𝛾 to rights violations which has to be counterbalanced by gains in utility in
order for rights violations to be permissible. Still, even if human thinking
about trading off rights is more subtle than that, it usually does make the
permissibility of rights violations dependent, in some way or other, on what
is gained by a rights violation – and this general feature is mirrored in the
Penalty Model.19 One feature of rights thinking which is not modelled by
the Penalty Model is the fact that the present generation is not obliged to
give future utility above 𝑈 the same weight as its own utility.
The Concavity Model
The last version to be discussed relies only on differentiable functions. It
represents rights by modelling the core idea that the present generation has
much less reason to increase future utility when future utility above 𝑈 is at
stake than when future utility below 𝑈 is at stake. That is: the marginal
value of the future generation’s utility above 𝑈 is very small in the present
generation’s choice problem. It decreases even further the further the future
generation is above 𝑈 . However, below 𝑈 , the marginal value of the future
19 Some may want to claim that the only type of “gain” which could make a rights
violation permissible is the protection of other rights and that no gain in mere
wellbeing could make up for however small of a rights violation (cf. Jensen (2002,
pp. 50–51)). (In practice, it is not always easy to keep these two types of gains as
justifications for rights violations apart: While it may seem, for example, that the
risks car drivers impose on bystanders are made permissible by the comparatively
large benefits they derive from their mobility it may in reality be the car drivers’
right to mobility which does the justificatory work). It should be noted that the
stylized logic of the Penalty Model is not apt to capture the position which only
allows trade-offs among rights.
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generation’s utility is very large in the present generation’s choice problem.
And it increases further the further below 𝑈 the future generation is.
In order to formalize this idea, use 𝑔 to denote a strictly concave function.
Use 𝑊2(𝑐2) = 𝑔 (𝑈(𝑐2)) to denote the function that enters the maximand
of the present-day decision-maker besides 𝑈1 (see figure 2 below). The
following assumptions are made:
∂𝑊2
∂𝑐2
∣∣∣
𝑐2=𝑐
=
∂𝑈2
∂𝑐2
∣∣∣
𝑐2=𝑐
∂𝑊2
∂𝑐2
≥ 0 for any 𝑐2
The choice problem of the present generation according to the Concavity
Model can then be stated as follows:
The Concavity Model
max (𝑈1 + 𝐸[𝑊2])
s.t. 𝐸[𝑈𝑖] ≥ 𝑈.
c2
W2 , U2
c
W2
U2
Figure 2
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The Concavity Model maps human thinking about rights into a formal
model by means of imputing a concave transformation of the future gener-
ation’s utility function into the present generation’s choice problem. This
mirrors the fact that for the present generation who decides on policy the
utility of future generations is very important up to 𝑈 and hardly important
beyond 𝑈 . It is interesting to note that it is, at least in one respect, struc-
turally similar to loss-averse utility functions: It sets a reference point and
makes the value function below the reference point steeper than the original
utility function. A rights violation plays a similar role in the rights-sensitive
choice problem as a loss plays in loss-averse utility functions.
It is important not to confuse the Concavity Model with the different idea
that future generations could possibly have a more concave utility function
than the present generation. The claim of the Concavity Model is that
even if (as assumed in this chapter) the present and future generation have
exactly the same utility function (that is: even if they draw wellbeing in
exactly the same way from consumption), the present generation’s choice
problem should use a concave transformation of the future generation’s util-
ity function. This is not to say that there might not be additional reasons to
work with a more concave utility function than typically assumed in climate
economics. Actually, many of the intuitive reasons for strong risk-aversion
which are brought forth in public discussions on climate policy can be in-
terpreted as implicitly making the empirical claim that the relationship
between utility on the one hand and consumption, temperature increase,
or emission concentration on the other hand is much more concave than it
seems at first sight. This might be so in particular due to such effects as
non-linearities and tipping points in the global ecosystem, the social ampli-
fication of risk (cf. Sunstein (2007, p. 138)), or a belief that the marginal
wellbeing of consumption becomes very low once a certain living standard
is achieved.
The advantages and disadvantages of the Concavity Model are similar to
the Penalty Model. It is even more aligned with existing economic modelling
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than the Penalty Model because it only involves smooth functions. This
feature, however, comes at the cost of mirroring the threshold aspect of
rights less clearly. As far as trade-offs are concerned, it does justice to
our intuition that rights are not totally immune to trade-offs and that the
permissibility of rights violations must in some way depend on what is gained
by a violation. Similarly to the Penalty Model, however, the principle for
allowing trade-offs is cruder than that of any full-blown rights theory.
Summary
The goal of this section consisted in formalizing rights. Since it is a delicate
issue how to model rights, we suggested three alternative formalizations,
each stressing different aspects of the logic of rights. The Side Constraint
Model packs the right of the future generation into a side constraint and
demands that the probability and graveness of potential rights violations
be kept sufficiently small. The Penalty Model and the Concavity Model
mirror the right of the future generation by a transformation of the fu-
ture generation’s utility function which enters the maximand of the present
generation’s choice problem. The former inserts a jump at 𝑈 , the latter
employs a concave transformation. They differ in particular with regard to
how sensitive they make the fulfillment of rights on the costs of doing so,
i.e. on how resistant to trade-offs they make rights. The presented ver-
sions are by no means exhaustive. And: they can easily be combined with
each other. The Concavity Model could, for example, additionally involve
a penalty for rights violations. The specific shapes of 𝑉 and 𝑊 could also
be modified, both below and above 𝑈 . And one could combine the Penalty
or the Concavity Model with the Side Constraint Model.
These three alternative ways of modelling the choice problem of a rights-
sensitive decision-maker will now be examined with respect to the risk-
aversion they imply. Even though all three versions stress different aspects
of rights thinking, they will be shown to all imply an additional kind of
risk-aversion compared to the risk-aversion of a utilitarian decision-maker.
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3.4 Rights and Risk-Aversion
We examine the claim that a rights-sensitive decision-maker exhibits ad-
ditional risk-aversion compared to a utilitarian decision-maker by proving
three results. The risk-aversion of a rights-sensitive decision-maker is la-
belled “additional” because the rights-sensitive decision-maker accepts the
reason for risk-aversion put forward by utilitiarianism – i.e. the curvature
of the utility function – but has reasons for risk-aversion on top of that –
i.e. the manner in which other agents’ utilities enter his choice problem.
3.4.1 Definitions
The choice problems we examine depend on two arguments (𝑐1 and 𝑐2)
rather than on one argument. Even though we are only interested in risk-
aversion with respect to 𝑐2, this case still diverges from the standard text-
book case of univariate risk-aversion. In terms of a preliminary task, we
therefore first have to define risk-aversion for such a multivariate case. The
fact that we are operating with a multivariate choice problem explains why
we are precluded from employing a straighforward comparative notion of
“more risk-averse” (since there are no such straightforward notions, see
e.g. Dorfleitner and Krapp (2007); Hellwig (2004); Kihlstrom and Mirman
(1981)).
For ease of exposition, we couch the definitions in the terms of the present
model, i.e. we presuppose decision-makers with a choice problem dependent
on 𝑈(𝑐1) and 𝑈(𝑐2), where 𝑐2 is stochastic.
Definition 1
For a given 𝑐1, the Certainty Equivalent (CE2) for 𝐹2
is the lowest 𝑐2 which the decision-maker does not dispre-
fer to 𝐹2.
This is a slight generalization of the standard definition of the Certainty
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Equivalent in order to include cases where there might be either no or more
than one 𝑐2 for which a decision-maker is indifferent between 𝑐2 and 𝐹2.
Definition 2
A decision-maker is risk-averse w.r.t. 𝑐2 (risk-averse𝑐2)
if
(i) for any 𝑐1 and any 𝐹2, CE2 ≤ 𝜇2 and
(ii) for any 𝑐1 there is at least one 𝐹2 for which CE2 < 𝜇2.
This definition is similar to partial risk-aversion as defined by Dorfleitner
and Krapp (2007). It allows us to say that a decision-maker is risk-averse𝑐2
if – given any 𝑐1 – the decision-maker is always willing to have 𝐹2 replaced
by 𝜇2 and is willing to have at least one 𝐹2 replaced by a 𝑐2 lower than 𝜇2.
The notions of risk-loving𝑐2 and risk-neutral𝑐2 can be defined analogously,
i.e. by reversing the inequalities or by replacing them by equalities, respec-
tively.
3.4.2 Results
We now characterize the additional risk-aversion of a rights-sensitivite de-
cision-maker by proving three results. First, a Proposition: The certainty
equivalent of a rights-sensitive decision-maker for any 𝐹2 is lower than or
equal to the certainty equivalent of a utilitarian decision-maker, but not
vice versa. Second, a Corollary: For any specification of the utility function
for which the utilitarian decision-maker is risk-averse, the rights-sensitive
decision-maker is risk-averse, too, but not vice versa. Third, a Theorem:
A rights-sensitive decision-maker is risk-averse for all concave – including
linear – utility functions.
We start by showing that the proposition holds for all three versions of
modelling rights. We restrict ourselves to the case where 𝐹2 is such that
𝐸[𝑈2] ≥ 𝑈 and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈2 < 𝑈) > 0. The proofs for the other cases are in
the appendix.
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The Side Constraint Model
According to the Side Constraint Model, the CE2 of a rights-sensitive deci-
sion-maker is either 𝑐 (in case the LHS of the side constraint is smaller than
or equal to 𝛽) or else −∞ (in case the LHS is larger than 𝛽). According to
utilitarianism, the CE2 is either 𝑐 (in case 𝐸[𝑈2] = 𝑈) or else larger than 𝑐
(in case 𝐸[𝑈2] > 𝑈).
Therefore, the CE2 of a rights-sensitive decision-maker according to the
Side Constraint Model is either equal to or, in most cases, lower than the
CE2 of the utilitarian decision-maker.
The Penalty Model
The Penalty Model is distinguishable from utilitarianism only by its inclu-
sion of a “penalty term” (−𝛾 ∫ 𝑐−∞ 𝑑𝐹2). Because this term is negative for
any 𝐹2 extending below 𝑈 , the CE2 of a rights-sensitive decision-maker is
lower than the CE2 of a utilitarian decision-maker.
There is one exception to this: In case 𝐸[𝑈2] = 𝑈 , the CE2 is 𝑐 not
only for for the utilitarian decision-maker but also for the rights-sensitive
decision-maker. This is so due to the jump in 𝑉 : There is no 𝑐2 below 𝑐
which the rights-sensitive decision-maker would not strictly disprefer to 𝐹2
in that case (even though he neither prefers 𝐹2 over 𝑐 in that case).
Therefore, the CE2 according to the Penalty Model is equal to or, in most
cases, lower than the CE2 of the utilitarian decision-maker.
The Concavity Model
By standard microeconomics, a concave transformation of an objective func-
tion implies a lower Certainty Equivalent than the original objective func-
tion. Therefore a rights-sensitive decision-maker trivially has a lower Cer-
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tainty Equivalent than the utilitarian decision-maker according to the Con-
cavity Model.20
We can thus conclude that the following result holds for all three versions
of modelling rights-sensitivity:
Proposition
(i) For any 𝑐1 and any 𝐹2, the CE2 of a rights-sensitive
decision-maker is equal to or lower than the CE2 of a
utilitarian decision-maker.
(ii) For any 𝑐1 there is at least one 𝐹2 for which the CE2
of a rights-sensitive decision-maker is lower than the CE2
of a utilitarian decision-maker.
The Proposition supports the claim that a rights-sensitive decision-maker
exhibits additional risk-aversion compared to a utilitarian decision-maker.
The former is often willing to give up more (and never willing to give up less)
expected utility of the future generation in order to do away with uncertainty
for the future generation (holding his own consumption fixed). The present-
day decision-maker is thus more hesitant to bequeath risky outcomes to his
descendants when relying on a rights-sensitive choice problem than when
relying on a utilitarian choice problem.
The Corollary to this result gives further substance to the claim about
additional risk-aversion. It follows directly from the Proposition: By (i),
the CE2 of a rights-sensitive decision-maker is always equal to or lower
than the CE2 of a utilitarian decision-maker. Therefore, a rights-sensitive
20 The meat of the analysis resides of course not in the trivial fact that a more concave
function implies additional risk-aversion but the points of substance are rather the
facts that, first, a concave transformation of the objective function can be interpreted
as a representation of rights-sensitivity (and therefore rights-sensitivity implies ad-
ditional risk-aversion) and, second, that this link between rights and risk-aversion
holds for other ways of modelling rights as well.
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decision-maker is risk-averse𝑐2 for any specification of 𝑈 for which the utili-
tarian decision-maker is risk-averse𝑐2 . And by (ii) from the Proposition, the
CE2 of a rights-sensitive decision-maker is strictly lower than the CE2 of a
utilitarian decision-maker for at least one 𝐹2. This implies that the rights-
sensitive decision-maker is risk-averse𝑐2 even if the utilitarian decision-maker
is risk-neutral𝑐2 (and sometimes even if he is risk-loving𝑐2). Together, this
yields:
Corollary
For any specification of 𝑈 for which a utilitarian decision-
maker is riskaverse𝑐2 , a rights-sensitive decision-maker is
risk-averse𝑐2 , too, but not vice versa.
The rights-sensitive decision-maker is therefore risk-averse𝑐2 in more cases
than the utilitarian decision-maker. The following Theorem is based directly
on the Corollary: Since a utilitarian decision-maker is risk-neutral𝑐2 in case
of a linear utility function and risk-averse𝑐2 in case of a strictly concave
utility function and since a rights-sensitive decision-maker is risk-averse𝑐2
if the utilitarian decision-maker is either risk-neutral𝑐2 or risk-averse𝑐2 , the
rights-sensitive decision-maker trivially is risk-averse𝑐2 for any concave util-
ity function, including linear utility functions.
Theorem
A rights-sensitive decision-maker is risk-averse𝑐2 for any
concave specification of 𝑈 .
By pointing out that the rights-sensitive decision-maker exhibits risk-
aversion𝑐2 even for linear utility functions, the Theorem makes plain how
rights-based risk-aversion derives from other grounds than the curvature of
the utility function.
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3.4.3 Discussion and Implications
These results imply that it does not suffice to base the evaluation of long-
term policies on average numbers only. For a rights-sensitive decision-maker,
the relevance of uncertainty extends beyond its effect on expected utility. In
the area of climate policy, for example, we cannot compare investments into
mitigation with investments into adaptation by only comparing the expected
returns of the two strategies.
The logic of such rights-based risk-aversion is amenable to intuition. The
utility functions of agents other than the decision-maker enter the choice
problem in a reference-dependent manner. Reference-dependence has be-
come an important rationale for explaining risk-attitudes in recent years.
But while the reference point in the models which have become prominent
– such as loss-aversion models – is for example constitued by the status
quo, the reference point which is at stake in the context of rights thinking
is a rights threshold. For the policy-maker who decides on issues which
affect not only himself it is in a distinct way very important not to let
other agents fall below the rights threshold and it is in a distinct way not
very important to benefit other agents beyond the rights threshold. This
particular way in which the rights threshold is relevant can be modelled by
a side constraint, by a penalty or by adjusting the marginal value of utility
above and below the threshold. In whatever way rights are modelled, the
asymmetry of ascribing a particularly large disvalue to the downside risk
of falling below 𝑈 while ascribing a particularly low value to exceeding 𝑈
generates risk-aversion.
Graphically, the point can be appreciated by comparing two probability
distributions over future utility. A rights-sensitive policy-maker will often
prefer the probability distribution with the lower variance even if it goes
along with a lower expected utility. Since his primary concern is the avoi-
dance of rights violations, his main focus in the comparison of probability
distributions is the size and shape of the area below 𝑈 rather than the mean.
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Figure 3
This also reveals how distributive justice is a more rigid yardstick with
respect to uncertainty than aggregate utility: In an uncertain environment,
the sum of expected utilities may be a good measure for characterizing the
“size of the pie” but the distribution of expected utilities is not a good
measure for characterizing the justice of the “split of the pie”.
It is interesting to observe that the right to 𝑈 often implies a duty of
the present generation to aim at a 𝐸[𝑈2] > 𝑈 (but never a duty to aim
at a 𝐸[𝑈2] < 𝑈). In other words, the logic of rights under conditions of
uncertainty leads to a duty to “overshoot”. If, for example, the right of
future generations is couched in egalitarian terms, the duty of the present
generation will often consist in working towards a path of rising expected
utility. The right of future generations to be at least as well off as the present
generation is often not be fulfilled by a path of constant expected utility.
The call for overshooting might be labelled as a duty to include a margin
of safety or a duty to err on the side of caution when rights are at risk. It
expresses one of the core intuitions behind the precautionary principle.
What does this chapter imply for the determination of the correct dis-
count rate? In economics, discussions of intergenerational justice usually
focus exclusively on discounting. Our reasoning, in contrast, implies that
doing justice to future generations is not primarily about choosing the right
discount rate. It is rather about replacing utilitarianism by a rights-sensitive
approach. Choosing an appropriate discount rate is only an important task
within the confines of utilitarianism. In a rights-sensitive choice problem,
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the goal of giving neither too much nor too little consideration to the con-
cerns of posterity is achieved by other means than by adjusting the discount
rate.
One might still wonder, however, whether the message of this chapter
cannot at least be translated into a prescription regarding the choice of
discount rate. At first sight, this seems impossible. The discount rate
determines the weight of future utility relative to present utility while a
rights-sensitive choice problem determines which part of future utility is
relevant in what way for present-day policy choice. More precisely: Stan-
dard economic models sum utilities over time and multiply each utility by a
discount factor. The logic of rights, in contrast, involves non-linear transfor-
mations of utilities and relegates some utilities from the objective function
into the side-constraint. At second sight, however, the Penalty Model and
the Concavity Model can partly be mimicked by a discounted utility model.
In order to do so we need the help of a state-dependent discount factor, i.e.
we can represent both 𝑉2 and 𝑊2 by multiplying 𝑈2 with a factor which is
dependent on 𝑐2.
21
We cannot, however, mirror the Penalty and the Concavity Model com-
pletely by modelling them in the structure of a utilitarian model with a
state-dependent discount factor. This is so because both of these models
involve a side constraint to the effect that 𝐸[𝑈2] > 𝑈 . There is no factor we
could place infront of future utility which would mimick this side constraint.
Such a discount factor would have to make the expectation of discounted
utilities sum up to −∞ in case the expectation of undiscounted utilities
sums up to less than 𝑈 and it would have to make for the representation
21 There are two technicalities to be taken note of: First, since there is no discount
rate corresponding to a negative discount factor, we want the discount factor always
to be positive. The state-dependent discount factor which generates 𝑉2 or 𝑊2 by
multiplication with 𝑈2, however, can in general only escape taking on negative val-
ues in some cases if 𝑈2 is either positive everywhere or negative everywhere in the
range of interest to us. Since utility functions are only unique up to positive affine
transformations, this is not much of a problem except for utility functions which
are unbounded below and above. Second, the correct state-dependent discount fac-
tor which is necessary to represent the Penalty or the Concavity Model cannot be
determined independently of the utility function at hand.
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of 𝑉2 or 𝑊2 otherwise. This is impossible. For analogous reasons, the Side
Constraint Model cannot be framed as a utilitarian choice problem with a
state-dependent discount rate.
How can we apply the message of this chapter to climate economics? One
suggestion is to give priority to cost-effectiveness studies over cost-benefit-
analyses. Cost-effectiveness studies (and related approaches) calculate the
most efficient path to achieve an exogenously given goal rather than aiming
at the goal of maximizing net present value (cf. IPCC (2001, ch. 10.1.3.1)).
The exogenously given goal can be interpreted as a side constraint repre-
senting the rights of future generations in the sense of the Side Constraint
Model.
Based on the Concavity Model, climate economists might also use a con-
cave transformation of the utility function for points of time in the further
future. Or, based on the Penalty Model, they might ascribe particular disu-
tility to consumption levels below (for example) the poverty line.
This chapter also underlines the importance of the communication of
uncertainty. For rights-sensitive policy-makers, uncertainty can make all
the difference in the evaluation of policies. Therefore, science should place
large importance on carefully communicating the uncertainty of relevant
variables rather than only communicating their expectation or mode. The
IPCC is exemplary in this respect (cf. IPCC (2007, p. 27)).
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented various ways of modelling the difference between a
rights-sensitive and a utilitarian decision-maker. We claim that on any of
these ways, the special importance a rights-sensitive decision-maker gives
to the fulfillment of rights of other agents and the low importance he may
give to benefiting other agents apart from fulfilling their rights implies risk-
aversion. This risk-aversion is additional to the kind of risk-aversion – based
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on the curvature of the utility function – already endorsed by the utilitarian-
ism of standard economics. It is based on how the utilities of other agents
enter the decision-maker’s choice problem and it therefore concerns risks
which are imposed rather than risks which are taken.
The practical import of this conclusion for climate policy is the following.
In current discussions, there is a clash between proponents of the precau-
tionary principle and proponents of economic cost-benefit analysis. The for-
mer stress the intuitive idea that the uncertainty associated with unabated
climate change yields a strong reason to rely on low-risk policies such as
mitigation. They claim that this uncertainty-based reason for mitigation
is stronger than standard economics can acknowledge. The latter observe
that the literature on the precautionary principle has so far been less than
successful in making its intuitive ideas precise and in justifiying its ratio-
nales for risk-aversion. This chapter agrees with both sides of the divide.
It agrees with proponents of the precautionary principle that we actually
do have more reason to eschew uncertainty than acknowledged within the
utilitarian framework of standard economics. But it also agrees with the
other side that this claim needs a sounder foundation than it has been given
so far. This chapter offers such a foundation by arguing that respect for the
rights of future generations implies risk-aversion.
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Appendix
In order to complete the proofs, we need to show that the proposition holds
also in the two cases which were not treated in section 3.4.2. First, there is
the case where 𝐹2 is such that 𝐸[𝑈2] < 𝑈 . Second, there is the case where
𝐸[𝑈2] ≥ 𝑈 but 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈2 < 𝑈) = 0. Both cases are not of genuine practical
significance.
The proposition holds true in the first case because all three versions of
rights-sensitive choice problems incorporate a side constraint to the effect
that 𝐸[𝑈2] ≥ 𝑈 . Given this side constraint, the CE2 for any 𝐹2 for which
𝐸[𝑈2] < 𝑈 is −∞. This infinitely negative CE2 is either lower than or, in
special cases, equal to the CE2 of a utilitarian decision-maker.
In order to show that the proposition holds true also in the case where
𝐹2 is such that 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈2 < 𝑈) = 0 we must examine the three rights models
in turn.
In case of the Side Constraint Model, the CE2 for such an 𝐹2 is 𝑐. This
is lower than (or, in the special case that 𝐸[𝑈2] = 𝑈 and 𝜎
2
2 = 0, equal to)
the CE2 of the utilitarian decision-maker.
In case of the Penalty Model, the choice problem of the rights-sensitive
decision-maker is indistinguishable from the utilitarian’s choice problem and
therefore the CE2 of the two decision-makers is equal. It suffices to show
that they are equal, however, since for the Proposition to be true it suffices
that the CE2 of the rights-sensitive decision-maker is lower for at least one
𝐹2. And this has already been shown in section 3.4.2 for cases of 𝐹2 with
support extending below 𝑈 .
In case of the Concavity Model, the result flows trivially from the concave
transformation of the utilitarian objective function.
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4.1 Introduction
Climate change can be seen as a unique case of historical injustice involv-
ing a complex intersection of global and intergenerational justice. It also
involves a diversity of goods and bads: first, the benefits of engaging in emis-
sion generating activities, such as driving cars, growing rice, or engaging in
deforestation,22 second, the climate damages which are a side effect of these
activities, and third, payments which allow for adaptation measures to these
climate damages. Some of the notable features of the climate change issue
are: first, in the past it was predominantly the North which created climate
change. Second, the South is more vulnerable to climate change. This is
due to geographical factors (e.g. the higher temperature in the South al-
ready before climate change occurs), the higher reliance on agriculture (an
especially vulnerable sector) and the lower adaptive capacities. Third, much
of the climate change that is caused by emissions materialises with a time
lag of several decades after the occurrence of those emissions. The following
figure inter alia displays some of these features, where “region X” is a blank
22 For simplicity’s sake, we refer also to deforestation and other ways of decreasing
sinks as emission generating activities. An umbrella term which would more pre-
cisely capture both – activities which add emissions to the atmosphere and activities
which diminish the removal of emissions from the atmosphere – would for example
be “emission concentration enhancing activities”. Note also that under a converse
perspective these benefits can be seen as costs, i.e. as what has to be foregone in
order to pursue mitigation measures (such mitigation burdens, however, not only
include the direct costs of stopping to engage in emission generating activities but
include, more indirectly, also transfers to pay others for mitigation measures and
funding for research).
71
4 Historical Emissions and Climate Justice
that can be filled in with either “the North” throughout the figure or with
“the South”:
Today’s?
emission??generating?activities
of?region?X?bring?forth
Benefits
Damages
The?larger?part?of?which
go?to?today’s?
members?of?region?X
The?smaller?part?of?which
go?to?tomorrow’s?
members?of?region?X
The?smaller?part?of?which
go?to?tomorrow’s
members?of?the?North
The?larger?part?of?which
go?to?tomorrow’s
members?of?the?South
Figure 4
The structure of the problem as shown in the above figure suggests that
the distribution of emission rights on the one hand and a fair way of dealing
with climate damages on the other hand is a rather complex matter. The
problem seems to be sui generis. In particular it differs from the standard
problem of how to respond to historical injustices (cf. Gosseries (2004, p.
37); on the topic of historical injustice in general see Meyer (2004, 2005)). In
standard cases of historical injustice, we often face the problem that earlier
generations of one community wronged earlier generations of another com-
munity and today’s generations of both communities are now looking for
an adequate way of responding to this historical fact and its impact on the
well-being of currently living and future people. In the climate change de-
bate, however, we are faced with the situation that earlier generations of one
community (the North) directly effect something to the detriment of later
generations of the other community (the South).23 It also differs from some
23 One implication of this is that it makes one of the answers to historical injustice more
difficult to sustain, namely the answer which argues that one should compensate
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other cases of historical justice in that it is not a problem of exclusively
one generation/community being wronged and exclusively another gener-
ation/community having committed the wrongs and/or wrongfully bene-
fiting. Rather, victims, wrongdoers, and beneficiaries are dispersed (but
unequally so) among different communities and generations. It also differs
from other instances of historical injustice in that the activity that con-
stitutes the wrong (that is: emitting) is not something that is wrong per
se (such as genocide or slavery), but rather is only wrongful when done
excessively.
We propose to disentangle this combination of questions of intergenera-
tional and global justice posed by climate change by splitting it up into the
following parts:
1. What level of present emissions can be justified on a global scale?
This is a question that we do not answer in this text. We simply
presuppose that a justifiable global quota can be determined in some
way (for plausible attempts at answering this question, see e.g. Caney
(2006a) or Page (2006)). While considerations of self-interest, global
justice and the significance of the relations between humans and the
rest of nature may play a role in determining such a quota, we think
that the consideration that yields the most stringent constraint on the
size of the justifiable quota is intergenerational justice.
2. How should this global quota be split up among the present population
of the planet? We aim at an answer to this question in sections 4.2
and 4.3. In section 4.2 we give an answer that does not take into ac-
count the history of past unequal emissions between the North and the
South. Section 4.3 then adds these historical emissions to determine
a more complete answer.
descendants of wronged persons because those descendants were wronged in that
their parents did not receive the appropriate compensation and that as a result
of this lack of payments the descendants are worse off than they would be if the
compensation to their parents had been paid (after their conception); see Sher (2005)
and Meyer (2008, sec. 5.1).
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3. Who should pay for the damages that are caused by emissions, in
particular assuming that people have not stayed and will not stay
within their fair shares as determined in section 4.3? We aim at an
answer to this question in section 4.4.
Question (ii) is concerned with how the mitigation burden should be dis-
tributed globally while question (iii) is concerned with how the adaptation
burden should be distributed globally. In the policy arena and in the nego-
tiation process these two issues will (and should) often be linked together.
We only separate them here for analytical purposes. It also makes sense
to hold the two issues of mitigation and adaptation initially apart, because
distributing emission rights (the mitigation issue) seems to be an issue of
pure distributive justice, while paying for the damage done by emissions
(the adaptation issue) at first sight looks more like an issue of compen-
satory justice even if in the end we will conclude that the latter is mostly
an issue of distributive justice as well.
A caveat at the start: we simplify strongly by always referring to the
contrast between countries of the South and the North. The distinction
between these two regions relies on the fact that there is a correlation –
partly based on causal interdependencies – between (i) having emitted more
in the past, (ii) having more benefits grounded in past emissions, (iii) being
less vulnerable to climate change, and (iv) being wealthier in general.
Of course, the correlation is far from perfect. Even though we rely on
the simplified perfect correlation for the purpose of our discussion, our ar-
gument becomes most relevant where the correlation is not perfect (e.g. a
poor country with high past emissions or a wealthy country with high vul-
nerability). The reason is that any argument that ascribes higher duties
to some regions than others will be based on one of the four features from
above (higher past emissions, higher benefits from past emissions, lower vul-
nerability, or higher wealth). So if those features all coincide in the North
there is not much to dispute since almost any argument will then ascribe
higher duties to the North. In such a case, the sole purpose of the argu-
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ment consists in the determination of the precise rationale for the duty of
the North and its exact extent. Analyzing how exactly the higher duties of
some countries are to be justified gains additional relevance, however, where
features (i) – (iv) do not coincide.
In a longer treatment it would be tremendously worthwhile to apply the
arguments not only to distinctions between the North, the South and coun-
tries with different combinations of features (i) – (iv) but also to socio-
economic groups within countries and in particular to different individuals.
Our real and ultimate interest lies in how emission rights and adaptation
payments are distributed to individuals. When we speak of the North and
the South we always implicitly either take those terms as an abbreviation
for an individual of the North or the South or else we assume a two-stage-
process where in a first stage climate justice between the countries of the
North and the South is determined after which each country will then, in
a second stage, internally distribute its mitigation and adaptation burdens
fairly to individuals. Both assumptions are of course questionable. The first
assumption – taking the terms “North” and “South” as abbreviations for
the individuals living there – is most questionable concerning individuals
who differ a lot from their compatriots concerning the above features (ii)
– (iv), in particular with respect to wealth. The second assumption – that
countries will internally justly distribute their climate duties – is of course
questionable as well.24 So, talking of the North and the South constitutes
a real simplification.
Another complication that we bracket is the fact that the size of climate
damages is not only determined by emissions. Responsibility for expos-
ing people to climate damages lies also with those who contribute, possibly
wrongfully, to vulnerability (where vulnerability is understood as the degree
24 How do countries internally distribute the mitigation burden? Under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol emission quotas were handed out to countries that then had to decide how to
reach their target. Practically, countries will reach their emission reduction targets
by, for example, regulations, taxes, giving permits to firms for free or auctioning
them (both with or without allowing trade of those permits) and buying emission
reductions from other countries.
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to which people are susceptible to suffer from and unable to cope with a
given level of climate change). A fuller treatment of compensatory justice
in climate change would have to include those who enhance vulnerability
as possibly standing under a duty to pay and, where contributing to ones
own vulnerability is at stake, as reducing their right to receive payments.
Accounting for vulnerability creation, however, is a difficult matter: What
level of enhancing vulnerability (or, respectively: what level of failing to
engage in measures which decrease vulnerability) are sufficiently high so as
to generate a compensatory duty? What kind of activities count as vulnera-
bility creation – does any policy, for example, which limits economic growth
qualify? We consider these intricate issues to be problems for another day
and focus this chapter on emissions as the salient cause of climate damages.
4.2 Prioritarian Distribution of Emission Rights
In this section we will ask how emission rights should be split up among
the present-day global population. We assume that some justifiable global
quota has been determined which now must be dealt out to the countries on
this planet. We are interested in a fair initial allocation of emission rights
which may then be changed by subsequent trade.
Determining a fair distribution of emission rights is of high relevance in
current climate policy. If the international community decides to cap total
emissions then the emissions allowed under this cap have to be distributed
in some way or other. As the right to emit was unlimited before a cap has
turned it into a scarce good, there is no pre-existing default distribution of
this asset on which one could fall back in case no distribution was agreed
upon. In the Kyoto Protocol a cap was agreed on only for the industri-
alised countries, with the US ultimately not ratifying the agreement. In
general, though, even with Kyoto enacted, the industrialised countries still
have higher per capita emissions than the developing countries, which have
no limits on emissions. The political philosopher interested in the pattern
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according to which emissions were dealt out to industrialised nations under
the Kyoto Protocol must be disappointed. The distribution was not based
on the application of any clear-cut and explicit criterion of distributive jus-
tice but rather reflects political negotiation (cf. Depledge (2002, p. 37))
in that a strong element of grandfathering25 is discernible (cf. Bartsch and
Mu¨ller (2000, p. 227)).
4.2.1 The Good to Be Distributed and the Standard to Be
Applied
We will judge the initial allocation of tradable emission rights according
to prioritarian standards and we must be careful to state clearly what ex-
actly the good is to which we apply these standards.26 We will often use a
rough shorthand and simply speak of distributing emissions while obviously
25 In the context of the distribution of emission rights, grandfathering refers to the
scheme that distributes emission rights according to past emissions: those with high
levels of past emissions are granted high levels of current emission rights. The idea
is sometimes implicit when the fairness of the distribution of emission rights is dis-
cussed in terms of percentage reductions or in the language of “burden sharing” (cf.
Baer (2002, p. 395)). Grandfathering looms large in policy debates but this is not
because of its moral appeal but rather because of its alignment with the interests of
those with high bargaining power. If one were to try to defend grandfathering from
a moral point of view in the sense of ascribing a right to the big polluters to keep up
contributing a large share of global emissions one runs into difficulties as we have
argued elsewhere (Meyer and Roser (2006, pp. 229ff.)). One could try to ascribe
such a right on the basis of principles of just acquisition of previously unowned
goods (such as the principles proposed by John Locke or Robert Nozick) or one
could try to ascribe such a right on the basis of legitimate expectations. If such a
strategy were successful – as we have argued it is not – the following section would,
of course, not make sense. If polluters really were entitled to (a certain proportion
of) the emissions level they have historically acquired then there would be no scope
for distributing emissions according to some pattern such as the priority view.
26 Some people speak of giving everyone a share of the atmosphere (Friends of the Earth
(2006)) or a share of the climate (Christian Aid (1999)). This is less than precise
since the issue is not “more or less atmosphere” or “more or less climate”. Others
speak of fairly distributing the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere (Neumayer
(2000)). This is not the best description of the good in question either because the
atmosphere can in principle take up huge amounts of greenhouse gases – almost
unlimited amounts, or at least much more than we would want to allow under any
plausible global cap on emissions. So, what is limited is not really the capacity of
the atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gases but rather the willingness of humans to
put up with the climate quality that would ensue from concentrations of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere above a certain level.
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what is up for distribution are tradable emission rights27 and not emis-
sions themselves. The goods to which prioritarian standards are applied
are, however, the benefits28 that the use of emission rights makes possi-
ble and not the emission rights themselves. Emission rights are beneficial
because they allow for what we call emission-generating activities such as
producing industrial commodities, farming, or flying into vacation.29 So,
what the shorthand of “distributing emissions” ultimately amounts to is
distributing (by distributing emission rights) the benefits of engaging in
emission-generating activities. Or, very roughly but more intuitively, we
could say that by distributing emission rights we are distributing economic
progress – “very roughly”, because, first, economic progress of course does
not capture everything that is beneficial about emission-generating activi-
ties (sometimes economic progress is not even itself something beneficial),
and, second, because there is no one-to-one relationship between emissions
and economic progress as some draw much more economic output from the
same amount of emissions than others.
The priority view differs from both egalitarianism and sufficientarianism.
Egalitarianism is problematic because insofar as it views equality as an in-
27 Also called “emission permits” or “emission allowances”. On a more general level,
note that the two main economic instruments to control emissions – cap-and-trade
and a tax – are analytically and in their practical effects quite similar. Thus, many
of our conclusions could also be applied to a regime that operated with a tax on
emissions rather than a cap. It would however need a separate chapter to discuss
which conclusions can precisely be transferred and which could not, depending on
how the cap-and-trade policy and the tax would exactly be fleshed out.
Tradability of emission rights is also an important (and not uncontroversial) as-
sumption because it allows those who have to reduce their emissions to do so at
much lower cost and those who cannot make good use of their emission rights to
turn them into cash. Because some degree of tradability will most certainly be part
of any future climate policy and because we believe it to be morally defensible (see
Meyer and Roser (2006, pp. 227f.)), assuming tradability is the more relevant case.
Note that what we discuss is only the initial allocation of emission rights. This is
what is of primary interest from a distributional point of view. The ensuing trade
is mostly interesting from an efficiency perspective.
28 We leave open what constitutes a benefit and the reader is free to insert something
himself, such as quality of life, happiness, or capabilities.
29 Besides this, emissions can also be beneficial in a different way, namely through the
climate change they cause: selected people (e.g. some farmers in Northern latitudes)
profit from a warming world.
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trinsic value, it runs into the “levelling down objection”: It has to admit
that in one respect there is something better about a situation where ev-
eryone is equally badly off compared to a situation where some are badly
off and some are well off. This reveals egalitarianism’s principal concern to
be comparative facts and not the absolute level of wellbeing of people. In
reaction to this, sufficientarianism claims that what matters fundamentally
is that everybody should have ‘enough’ and not equally much. While the
position is not open to the levelling down objection, it is, to say the least,
difficult to defend a strict threshold which is so important as to give people
below it absolute priority over people above it (cf. Arneson (2000, p. 56)
or Roemer (2004)). The priority view can be seen as aiming at taking into
account the intuitions behind egalitarianism and sufficientarianism in the
most plausible way (for a more extensive discussion see e.g. Holtug and
Lippert-Rasmussen (2007), Meyer and Roser (2006), and Casal (2007)). It
is the view that benefiting people matters regardless of how much others
have but that we should give greater weight to benefits for people who are
badly off than to benefits for people who are well off. Thus, in many cases
the priority view will prescribe an equal distribution of the goods in question
but it can also justify benefiting people unequally, namely to benefit those
more who are badly off and to benefit those more who can draw more bene-
fits from the good in question. It can thus be called a kind of non-relational
egalitarianism or also a utilitarianism with a bias towards equality.
4.2.2 How to Apply the Priority View
We will proceed in two steps in order to determine a fair split of the global
emissions quota. In the first step (section 4.2) we disregard the past. In
the second step (section 4.3) we will take the large differences in historical
emissions into account. Our argument will show in the first step that devel-
oping countries have a right to either equal or higher per capita emissions
compared to developed countries. In the second step we will then argue that
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taking the past into account strengthens the claim that developing countries
should receive higher emission rights.
In the first step (that is, with past emissions blinded out) we have to
make explicit how exactly we intend to apply prioritarian standards to the
distribution of emission rights. We will present two options and generally
rely on the first one for the reasons given below and also because the second
option only strengthens, and in no way weakens, the general conclusion given
by relying on the first option (which basically is that the South should get
above average per capita emission rights). According to the first option
we treat the fair distribution of emission rights as though the distribution
of other goods was completely faded out from our view. According to the
second option we take the currently existing highly unequal distribution of
goods as given and distribute emission rights in light of it.
Both options are problematic. The problems of the first option are (i) that
it abstracts in an unnatural way from the situation in the real world where
the background distribution is hugely unequal and (ii) that if one applied
this procedure of abstracting from the distribution of other goods to the
distribution of every single good in the world one would not necessarily
arrive at an overall distribution which would satisfy prioritarian standards
since the different goods interact with each other in numerous ways relevant
to the benefits people receive from having access to them; thus, following
the first option generally is likely to produce unequal results for different
people that do not accord to prioritarian standards. The problem with
the second option – distributing emissions rights in light of the currently
existing highly unequal distribution of other goods – is that it would yield
a very simple answer: Give all the emission rights to the South. Following
the second approach we would reach this conclusion regardless of whether
we rely on the priority view, egalitarianism or utilitarianism30. However,
it seems less than reasonable to aim at bringing the overall distribution
30 For this to be true for utilitarianism we have to make the common assumption of
diminishing marginal utility. For why the simple conclusion is true in the case of
the priority view (or egalitarianism), see below.
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of goods closer to the prioritarian (or egalitarian or utilitarian) ideal by
adjusting the distribution of only one particular good.31 This is particularly
so, if considerations of distributive justice concerning the overall distribution
of resources play a minor role in current politics while such considerations
do play a considerable role concerning the specific good of emission rights.
Since both options are shown to be problematic, it is not at all straight-
forward how to apply the priority view to the distribution of a single good.
This could be called a problem of “local justice,”32 that is, a problem of
the just distribution of a certain slice (here: emission rights) of the whole
universe of goods. One might want to respond to the problem by denying
that we can meaningfully ask how a certain single resource should be dis-
tributed; instead, questions of distributive justice can only meaningfully be
raised concerning a whole bundle of goods such as, say, natural resources
or primary goods (or even: only about all goods taken together; or even
stronger: only about the design of institutions affecting the distribution of
those goods). However, we are faced with such problems of fair distribution
of certain specific goods in our non-ideal world. As theoreticians we might
want to restrict ourselves to answering the more general questions of ideal
theory,33 but answers to them will not by themselves provide us with an-
swers to those questions that political reality hands to us. Currently, it is
31 A further complicating aspect of taking the second approach is this: One could also
take into account the effect the principle for the distribution of emission rights has on
the availability and distribution of other goods. Such effects can take the form of the
worry that distributing emission quotas to countries according to their population
(that is, per capita emission rights) could incentivise population growth (which is
not a grave worry, see Baer (2002, fn. 17)) or the form of the worry that too abrupt
a change from the current pattern of distribution could cause a perturbation of the
world economy to the detriment of everyone. It can also take the opposite form of
the hope that when the principle for distributing emissions consists in adjusting the
quota according to the GDP of a country (Bush’s intensity approach) this would yield
incentives for more emission efficient production, and, in allowing emissions to rise
with output, would not hamper economic growth. Such growth might ultimately
benefit everyone, including those who initially get few emission rights in such a
scheme where emission quotas are proportional to GDP (for a critical discussion of
this argument, see Singer (2002, pp. 38–40)).
32 See Gosseries’ (2004, 2007) remarks on this issue. He relies on Elster (1992).
33 See also Rawls’ remarks (1971, p. 8) on starting with more tractable questions by
limiting the subject matter of his investigation.
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not an issue of much political relevance of how to globally distribute, say,
all natural resources (or all goods in general) but the issue of how to dis-
tribute emission rights is one which is high on the agenda; given that a cap
on emissions is set we cannot even escape distributing them in some way
or other. By setting a cap, a good that earlier was available in unlimited
quantities has suddenly been turned into a scarce good and, thus, we are
confronted with the question of how to distribute this newly created good
worth billions of dollars. We hope to show that from the point of view of
principles of justice there is something to be said about the distribution of
this specific good even though such good-specific questions of “local justice”
do not belong to the questions that normative theorists are most used to
answering.34
4.2.3 The Priority View and Emission Rights
So, what would the first option – that is, abstracting from the existing back-
ground distribution of other goods – demand concerning the distribution of
emission rights? It would simply demand an equal per capita distribution
of these rights. The priority view has a justification for the unequal distri-
bution of a fixed amount of a good in two cases only: first, if some of the
recipients are worse off than others; second, if some of the recipients can
extract more benefits out of the particular good than others.35 Both justifi-
cations are excluded by the assumption that the background assumption is
not taken into account. For the second justification this is true because how
many benefits individuals can draw from an emission right depends on the
endowments of other goods such as wealth, the natural environment, or the
34 Gosseries (2004, p. 51) notes, however, how we are used to such good-specific or
sector-specific thinking concerning distribution in practice: Even though a country
might have a general redistributive scheme, it might still keep up sector-specific re-
distributive measures such as cheaper tickets for senior citizens for public transport.
35 A third legitimate reason for inequality arises once the free choices of individuals
are taken into account. The priority view can take them into account by catering
to the idea of responsibility, that is, respecting the value of free choice even if this
should mess up the optimal prioritarian distribution.
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industrial structure of one’s country. Thus, with the background distribu-
tion regarded as irrelevant, the priority view would demand a distribution
of equal per capita emission rights.
The two justifications for inequality in prioritiarianism do apply, however,
if we go for the second option (that is, assuming the presently existing global
distribution of goods as background). The first justification clearly applies:
The South is much less well off than the North. It is so much less well off
that we could give all emission rights to the South and it would still – even
with all the cash the South could generate from selling these emission rights
– be overall and for the foreseeable future worse off than the North.36 Thus,
the priority view demands giving all emission rights to the South.
The second prioritarian justification for an unequal distribution of a par-
ticular good – that is, that some can draw more benefits from the good – is
also relevant. One can cite various aspects which have an influence on how
useful an emission right is to someone:
1. Geographical factors make some people more reliant on emissions, e.g.
because they need to heat their houses a lot in the winter.
2. Another factor is wealth; according to the hypothesis of diminishing
marginal utility, one and the same good is deemed more valuable in
the hands of a poor person than a wealthy person: “Subsistence emis-
sions” are more important than “luxury emissions” (cf. Shue (1993)).
However, at least as a matter of transitory justice, one has to take
36 This claim is mainly backed up by the thought that while the global total of emission
rights under a cap which sets the limit below business-as-usual emissions might
be of tremendous economic value, emission rights are still only one good among
many. With a back-of-the-envelope-calculation: Even if we inserted large values and
assumed that 7 billion people with a right to per capita emissions of 10 tons yearly
would trade these emissions at $100 per ton, the total value of these emission rights
would still only be a fraction of the gap in GNI between high income countries on
the one hand and low and middle income countries on the other hand (according
to the World Bank (2008, Table 1.1) this gap was around $27 trillion or, based on
Purchasing Power Parity, $12 trillion in 2006). In per capita terms it would be even
clearer.
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into account that given that people in the North are so accustomed
to an energy intensive lifestyle there is also a reason to say that emis-
sion rights are in one respect more valuable for rich people than poor
people. See also fn. 41 below.
3. Another factor that might be cited as revealing the higher utility of
emission rights for some countries than others is emission intensity,
that is, the amount of emissions per GDP. Countries with low emission
intensity produce a lot of GDP per emission and thus, according to the
prioritarian logic, they might claim a high share of emission rights.37
However, what really counts is the emission intensity at the margin,
that is, how much GDP could be produced with an additional unit of
emission. At the margin, even a country which in the global division
of labour hosts many industry branches with a high emission intensity
and thus has a high overall emission intensity might not do badly.
All things considered this second prioritarian justification for inequality
(appealing to the unequal benefit that different individuals draw from a
particular good) gives us a rather blurry picture and so, one conclusion
we can definitely draw is that it does not support giving the North above
average emission rights. Even if some tendency as to whether it is the South
or the North which profits more from an emission right could be determined,
one would have to take into account that such a tendency would be watered
down significantly under the assumption of emissions trade. If we assume
the tradability of emission rights, the scope for unequal benefiting from
emissions is drastically reduced because those who profit little from emission
rights can simply turn them into money.
37 Interestingly, there is no very clear picture concerning the connection between the
wealth and the emission intensity of a country. Developed countries do not have a
lower carbon dioxide emission intensity. They do have a lower emission intensity
when all greenhouse gases are taken into account. But even in the latter case there
are many exceptions with Australia for example having a much higher emission
intensity than Brazil (Baumert and Pershing (2005, pp. 25f.)).
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So we may safely conclude – and this is taking into account all of the
above discussed considerations but not considering past emissions – that the
priority view demands at least equal per capita emission rights or else more
(or possibly: all) emission rights for the South. Since other considerations38
in this chapter will lead us to argue for higher than equal per capita emission
rights for the South and because in current climate negotiations it is no
option anyway to give higher emission rights to the South, we will, in the
following parts of the chapter, rely on the minimal conclusion of the first
option that the priority view without taking the past into account speaks
in favor of equal per capita emission rights.
The following table the discussion in section 4.3 thus far.
First justification
for inequality:
Some recipients
are worse off
than others
Second justification for
inequality:
Some recipients can draw
more benefits from emission
rights than others
Conclusion
Option 1:
Abstracting from
the background
distribution of
other goods
Does not apply
in case of
Option 1
Does not apply in case of
Option 1
Equal per
capita emission
rights
Option 2:
Taking into
account the
currently existing
inequality in the
distribution of
other goods
Speaks in
favour of more
or all emission
rights for the
South
Difficult to extract a
clear picture based on
such potential factors as
needs due to
geographical
circumstances, wealth,
or emission intensity. In
case of tradability this
justification loses much
of its relevance.
Higher per
capita emission
rights for the
South
38 Note that these other considerations partly amount to taking into account the back-
ground distribution of other goods (as demanded by the second option). They do
so in a certain way, however: It will only be the inequality of benefits associated
with past emissions which is taken into account (or possibly, as indicated in the
conclusion, also the inequality in climate damages) and not the whole inequality in
the background distribution.
85
4 Historical Emissions and Climate Justice
4.3 Currently Living People Benefiting from Past
Emissions
In a second step we will now examine how we will have to amend this answer
when we take the past into account. We will argue that the higher historical
emissions of the North give us reasons to tilt the allocation of emission rights
in favour of the South.
The difference in historical emissions between the North and the South is
far from negligible. Developed countries are responsible for more than three
times as many emissions between 1850 and 2002 than developing countries
(Baumert and Pershing (2005, p. 32)) while the latter host a much larger
part of humanity. In the policy arena a counterbalance to the historical
inequality in emissions was most prominently discussed under the heading
of the “Brazilian Proposal” (for an overview see La Rovere et al. (2002)).
The Brazilian Proposal received little support. More generally, there is quite
some resistance to counterbalancing past emissions. Important objections
include the following:39
1. A first objection states that currently living people should not be
made responsible for the acts of their ancestors and should not be put
at a disadvantage simply because the people inhabiting their country
before them emitted too much.
2. A second objection states that one can only be blamed for a certain
act if one knows – or is liable to know – of the harmful effects of the
act whereas it is debatable whether until recently knowledge of the
harmful effect of emissions was sufficiently widespread.
3. A third objection points to the relevance of the non-identity problem;
no one can claim to be worse off or better off than she would be had
39 In addition to these three points there are also practical difficulties: First, of estimat-
ing past emissions and, second, of bringing it into the negotiating process because
it is neither a simple (but rather a complex) proposal nor is it one which serves the
interests of those with the highest bargaining power.
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another climate policy been pursued in the sufficiently distant past.
Note that each of the objections attacks emissions behind a different date
of the past. The first one concerns emissions by people who are now dead,
the second emissions, say, before the first IPCC report in 1990,40 and the
third emissions (and policies influencing emissions) so early as to be a de-
termining factor of the number and identity of people living today.
4.3.1 Two Ways in Which Past Emissions Are Relevant
There are, however, two ways of taking past emissions into account (more
precisely: taking part of past emissions into account) that are not suscep-
tible to the three objections. The first way turns on what we consider the
relevant units of concern and, in particular, what temporal extension they
have. If as prioritarians we demand equality of emission benefits, do we
demand equality at each point in time or equality over the whole lifespan
of individuals? If we go for the latter option (which is the more plausible
for the majority of egalitarians according to Holtug and Lippert-Rasmussen
(2007, p. 10)) then one part of past emissions enters very naturally into the
fair deal concerning the present distribution of emission rights; namely, the
emissions that occurred during the life of the presently living. The simple
idea is that people of the North already enjoyed much economic progress
associated with emissions during their lifetime: if we want to equalise the
benefits from emission-generating activities then a larger part of the remain-
ing benefits should go to people in the South so they have the opportunity
to “catch up”. This is one way (the first of two) of arguing for above average
per capita emission rights for the South.
The first and third objections obviously do not speak against this way
of taking past emissions into account. What about the second objection,
40 Gosseries (2004) lists some salient dates which might serve as an alternative to
1990: 1840 (as proposed by the Brazilian Proposal), 1896 (first scientific text on the
greenhouse effect by Svante Arrhenius), 1967 (first serious modelling exercises), and
1995 (second IPCC report). One might also add the IPCC reports from 2001 and
2007 as well as the very beginning of industrialisation in the 18th century.
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that is, the claim that the ignorance of past polluters does not allow the
attribution of responsibility for those emissions to them? It has no bite
either. The reason is that the above argument does not justify higher emis-
sion rights for the South as compensation for past wrongdoing of the North.
It justifies them by the idea of equalising emission benefits over the lifetime
of individuals. If an individual of the North already has used up his share,
it does not matter whether he did so knowingly and wrongfully or not.41
The second justifiable way of taking past emissions into account for the
determination of the presently fair shares relies on the fact that we do not
want to equalise emissions but rather benefits of emissions. And since the
industrialisation of the ancestors of the people currently living in the North
yields benefits up to today and much more so for people of the North than
the South, this has to be taken into account even if the emissions were
caused by people who are now dead. Benefits from past emissions include,
for example, schools and streets that were built before those presently alive
were born but that are still useful today.
The first two objections obviously do not speak against this way of taking
past emissions into account. The third objection (the non-identity problem)
has no bite either: We do not claim that people of the South are worse
off than they would be without emissions in the distant past and neither
do we claim that people of the North benefit from industrialisation in the
distant past in the sense of being better off than they would be had there
been no industrialisation. They only benefit in the sense that since their
conception they enjoy being brought up in an industrialised world while
others cannot enjoy such circumstances. To illustrate, if an inhabitant of
the North had been taken after his birth and had been transferred to a slum
41 This approximate conclusion has to be qualified somewhat as a matter of transitory
justice (cf. Gosseries (2007)): If people were legitimately ignorant about the prob-
lematic nature of their emissions then some legitimate expectations accompany the
ownership of their emission benefits. This is the case, for example, if they made
investments on the basis of the belief that they would be able to keep up their emis-
sion levels. If one cut emission rights of people in the North too abruptly they would
actually end up not with equal overall emission benefits as people in the South but
rather – due to the disruption of their life plans – worse off.
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in the South, he would be worse off than he would be had he been raised
in the developed world. Due to the non-identity problem it is still true,
however, that if he is not transferred he cannot claim to be better off than he
would be without industrialisation, since if a different economic development
path had been pursued, most likely, he would not exist today. But what is
true is that due to past economic policies and the emissions accompanying
them the benefits of living in an economically developed world have been
bequeathed to some currently living people since their conception but not to
others. So, if there is at present more “economic progress to be given away”
(that is: emission rights to be distributed which allow for the emissions
that accompany economic progress), and if we want to give everyone an
equal share of economic progress – taken here as the main benefit associated
with emissions – people of the South should get a disproportionate share of
emission rights because people of the North have already received a large
part of their share by inheritance from their ancestors.
Against this second way of taking the past into account it might be ob-
jected that it is questionable whether the receipt of benefits generates any
obligations at all. This is even more debatable if the benefits were “im-
posed” rather than voluntarily accepted, as is the case with being born into
an industrialised world. The answer to this worry is that the second way of
taking past emissions into account does not rely on the premise that inher-
iting emission benefits generates obligations to give something to others in
turn. The argument only presupposes is that those who were born with a
large “slice of the pie” have a smaller claim when it comes to splitting up
the rest of the pie.
4.3.2 Why the Objections Are Irrelevant
So, our conclusion is that based on the unequal benefits enjoyed by people
in the North and the South certain parts of past emissions should be taken
into account for the purpose of distributing emissions rights today; namely,
those past emissions that occurred during the lifetime of the presently living
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and those past emissions that were side products of benefits which are still
around today.42 Not all inequality in historical emissions should be taken
into account, however; those emissions that belonged to people who are now
dead and which yield no benefits for the currently living should be written
off.
We can now look at the general reason why the three objections do not
pose any problem for our two ways of taking past emissions into account.
All three objections rely on the idea that lower than equal shares of emission
rights for the North must be grounded in the idea of compensation, that
is, the idea that the wrongdoer (or the beneficiary of a wrongful action)
must return something to those who are harmed. The idea of compensa-
tion is present in the three objections as follows. The third objection (the
non-identity problem) denies that past emissions can be seen as harmful (or
beneficial) and, so, if there is no harming (or benefitting), then no compen-
sation is appropriate. It also denies that some are made better off through
emissions than they would otherwise be and so there is no beneficiary. The
second objection (ignorance about the climate problem) claims that even if
past emissions could be seen as harmful, they still cannot be seen as wrong-
ful; as such, no compensation is owed. The first objection (being responsible
for ones ancestors deeds) goes further in stating that even if past emissions
were both harmful and wrongful, still, compensation is not owed, reason
being that compensation is something that the wrongdoer himself must pay
and not his descendants.
Even if the objections were based on sound premises when applied to
other positions,43 they have no bite against our argument since our two
ways of taking past emissions into account in no way rely on the idea of
compensation for past wrongs. They consider the distribution of emission
42 Caney (2006b) argues that evening out inequalities in emissions over time relies on
a collectivist framework. Note that by focusing on the benefits of past emissions
enjoyed by the presently living, we can eschew this problem.
43 We do not believe that the objections are wholly based on sound premises; see
e.g. the discussion of the non-identity problem in Meyer (2008, sec. 3.1) and the
discussion of the Community Pays Principle in section 4.4.
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rights as a problem of pure distributive justice without any reference to
harm or wrong.44 The idea is simply to distribute the benefits associated
with emission-generating activities equally among the presently living – and
in order to achieve this goal it is necessary to give people of the South higher
shares of emission rights.
This is not to say that the three objections are not important. They are
important when it comes to a different question: Not the question of how to
distribute the benefits of emission-generating activities fairly but rather the
question of how to deal with the bad consequences of emission-generating
activities fairly. Concerning this latter question – that is, justice concerning
the climate change that is caused by industrialisation – the three objections
are relevant, indeed. This question will be taken up in section 4.4. In this
section we assumed climate damages to be an issue that can be separated
from the issue of a fair distribution of emission rights.
4.3.3 A Numerical Illustration
To make the point of this section and in particular the point of the next
section comprehensible we will present the basic idea in a simple numerical
illustration. Assume that we have two islands called “North” and “South”.
Both islands consist of three persons: “Old”, “Middle”, and “Young”. On
both islands, Young is born after the death of Old. We have two time-
periods: period I and II.
The question is: Presupposing the emissions of period I, how should emis-
sion rights be distributed in period II among the North and the South? We
assume that each island is able and willing to fairly distribute its emission
44 Note also that there is something peculiar about seeing mitigation as a kind of
compensation for not mitigating: It can only be applied in the sense of seeing present
mitigation as compensation for past lack of mitigation but of course not in the
synchronic fashion of seeing present mitigation as compensation for a lack of present
mitigation. This is in contrast to paying for adaptation costs, which can be seen as
compensation for a lack of present mitigation.
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rights internally.45 An important assumption is that 2 units of emissions
in the North in period I create 2 units of benefit for the North in period I,
and 1 unit of benefit for the North in period II (assume for example that
the 2 units of emission were used in period I for (i) an airplane flight into
vacation and (ii) the building of a school: The airplane flight is beneficial
only at the time of the emission while the school building yields a benefit in
both periods). The same applies to the South. We assume that the South
emitted 8 units in period I and the North emitted 12 units in period I.
Period?I Period?II
For?North?Old 6
For?North?Middle 6 3
For?North?Young 3
For?South?Old 4
For?South?Middle 4 2
For?South?Young 2
Benefits?associated?with?
emissions?from?period?I? in?
Figure 5
Let us say that there are 10 units of emissions to be distributed in period
II. How many should the North get and how many should the South get
according to our reasoning? People in the North alive in period II already
own 12 emission benefits. 6 of those 12 benefits are those that North-Middle
enjoyed in period I (our first way of taking the past into account) and the
other 6 benefits are those that North-Middle and North-Young enjoy in
period II as a result of the Northern emissions in period I (our second way
of taking the past into account). People in the South alive in period II in
45 Later on we add compensation payments to the discussion. Of course, we assume
that they distribute these internally fairly as well.
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contrast only own 8 emission benefits (4+2 from South-Middle and 2 from
South-Young).
So, our argument says that of the 10 emission benefits to be distributed,
the North should get 3 (together with its 12 benefits this sums up to 15)
and the South should get 7 (together with its 8 benefits this sums up to 15
as well). Given that these emission rights are fairly distributed internally
within each island,46 distributive justice among the people alive in period II
is created in such a way. Not all past emissions have been taken into account:
The inequality of emissions benefits between North-Old and South-Old in
period I will forever remain without relevance. But a large part of historical
emissions is deemed relevant for the present allocation of emission rights.
What would this mean in practice for a Post-Kyoto treaty? Enacting the
fair solution demands allocating a share of emissions to each country that
is either above or below the equal-per-capita share depending on whether
the country has a lot or few benefits from past emissions. Countries then
have to see to it that they internally distribute the mitigation burden fairly,
which amounts to disproportionately burdening those citizens who already
own many emission benefits. This can probably not be approximated more
accurately than by each citizen’s wealth.
At the country level, however, benefits from past emissions can not only
be approximated by the country’s wealth but also by a measure which adds
up cumulative past emissions of a given country but discounts those emis-
sions according to how far in the past they lie. The idea of such discounting
is that emissions closer to the present yield more benefits for the presently
living. Relying on such a measure as an approximation for benefits from
past emissions instead of relying on wealth as an approximation amounts
to either assuming that the current inhabitants of each country should be
made responsible for how many benefits are drawn from a given amount of
emissions in the past or else to make the simplifying assumption that every-
46 North-Young could blame North-Middle for emitting so much in period I as a result
of which the whole North gets few emission rights in period II. North-Young might
punish North-Middle for this by, for example, cutting its social security.
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one draws the same amount of benefits from a given amount of emissions. It
also leaves open whether wealth is a good specification of what constitutes
benefits from emission generating activities.
Note that these ways of taking past emissions into account for the specifi-
cation of the distribution of the mitigation burden are similar to but distinct
from the Brazilian Proposal. The latter is the most prominent suggestion
for taking past emissions into account. However, in its calculations it relied
on the cumulative effect of emissions since 1840 on global average surface
temperature, that is, it discounted past emissions not according to how
many benefits they yield today but according to how much damage they
do.
4.4 Who Must Pay for Climate Damages?
The last section discussed a fair deal concerning emissions as the cause
of climate change and this section discusses a fair deal concerning climate
change as the effect of these emissions, both with a special eye towards the
relevance of the past. If global climate policy negotiations are guided by
power and self-interest the South will lose on both issues: it will not only
be treated unfairly in the realm of the distribution of emissions but also in
the realm of the distribution of costs that arise out of these emissions.
These costs have two aspects: First, the climate damages themselves,
and second – since the impact of emissions not only depends on the level of
climate change produced by them, but also in the human reaction to this
change – the adaptation costs necessary to minimise or at least decrease this
impact. In this section our ultimate concern is justice concerning all costs
– i.e. the adaptation costs plus the damages that remain even after optimal
adaptation. But: since the damages themselves cannot be transferred from
one person to another, justice concerning the whole costs of climate change
will have to be reached by taking only the one aspect of who is responsible
for adaptation costs as a variable under control of policy.
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The issue of injustice concerning climate damages arises on two levels.
First, the South will be hit harder by climate change. This is so indepen-
dently of how much climate change occurs and who is causally responsible
for it. It is likewise so even if only non-anthropogenic climate change oc-
curred or if everybody in the past had stuck to their fair share of emissions.
The most important reasons for the higher vulnerability of the South are
geographical factors, the higher reliance on agriculture and the lower adap-
tive capacities. Second, and independently of the first point, it is the case
that people have exceeded and predictably will exceed their fair shares as
determined in the last section. In any realistic scenario the North will have
exceeded its share, and will have done so more than the South. In any case,
we will presuppose that this is so in this section.
How should climate damages, and in particular the fact that the South
will be particularly vulnerable to climate change while at the same time
being causally less responsible for it, be dealt with from the point of view of
justice? One answer that quickly comes to mind is that the South is owed
compensation for its suffering and that the North as the main culprit for
climate change should provide sufficient measures of compensation. This
section will point out the problems of this view and suggest to view climate
damages primarily as a reason for redistribution due to undeserved benefits
and harms rather than as a reason for compensation due to wrongdoing.
4.4.1 Distributive and Compensatory Justice
To argue for this conclusion we will first discuss compensation (in three
versions) and then redistribution. We have to make clear exactly what kind
of compensation and redistribution we are interested in.
One way to make the distinction between the basic idea of redistribution
and compensation starts with the premise that there is some baseline distri-
bution of goods that is just. This baseline distribution is determined on the
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one hand by a certain criterion (such as the priority view, egalitarianism, or
sufficientarianism or possibly even simply the status quo distribution) and
on the other hand by changes to the distribution which someone experiences
as a result of his own responsible (and non-wrongful) choices. Deviations
from this baseline then call for two different kinds of reactions. In case
the reaction the deviation calls for is based on the wrongfulness of what oc-
curred, we are operating in the realm of compensatory justice. In case the
reaction the deviation calls for is based on the idea of evening out unde-
served benefits or harms (which are due to for example luck or harmful but
non-wrongful actions), we are operating in the realm of distributive justice.
This is the kind of distinction between distributive and compensatory
justice that we will make use of. The basic idea is to ask: which duties
to pay for adaptation to climate change rely for their justification on the
wrongfulness of what was done, i.e. which duties can be traced back to
the compensatory rationale? Any duties that cannot be so traced back will
fall into the category of the redistributive rationale and will be regarded
as grounded in the objective of levelling off undeserved benefits and harms.
Whether payments for adaptation costs are justified on the basis of the
compensatory or redistributive rationale also determines the size of such
payments.
Two remarks are appropriate: First, not everybody regards evening out
undeserved benefits and harms through redistribution as a moral imperative
(see e.g. Cane (1993, p. 355)); and some, namely sufficientarians, regard
it as an imperative only up to the point where everybody has “enough”.
We will assume that undeserved benefits and harms should be evened out
according to prioritarian standards, but we believe that the basic point of
distinguishing compensatory and redistributive rationales remains interest-
ing also for theorists who do not see undeserved benefits and harms as giving
weighty reasons for redistribution.
Second, note that we are operating with a narrow notion of compensa-
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tion which is not completely in line with the way the terminology is used
in other contexts where the notion is also used for payments which are due
to non-wrongful harm-doing. An example of this use is given by Feinberg
(1978): A backpacker is surprised by an unexpected blizzard and breaks
into a mountain cabin, eating food there and burning furniture to protect
himself from the cold. He was surely justified in doing this to save himself
and thus he wasn’t wrongful in harming the owner of the hut, but he owes
compensation to the latter anyway. We surely agree that wrongfulness is
not a necessary condition for justifying payments, whether or not such pay-
ments are labelled compensatory payments. All we argue for is that it is
an interesting question in the intergenerational context of climate change to
separate payments based on wrongfulness from those not based on wrong-
fulness and that the latter can be seen as based on other (namely, redis-
tributive) concerns than the former. Note that, in principle, the justifiable
payments of the backpacker to the owner of the hut could also ultimately
be seen as grounded in the redistributive concern of levelling off undeserved
deviations: the owner suffers from undeserved harms while the backpacker
has benefitted from using the hut. It could be claimed that, ultimately,
the justification for demanding payments from the latter consists in evening
out such undeserved harms and benefits.47 At least, that is how we will
treat non-wrongful harm-doing in the intergenerational context of climate
change.
We will distinguish three versions of compensatory payments depending
on who has the duty to come up with them.48 The most natural duty bearer
for compensatory payments is the emitter of wrongful emissions himself. We
call this the Emitter Pays Principle (EmPP). Such compensation can also
47 Indeed, even theorists who see no reason for levelling off good and bad luck in
general, might see some reason to do so in the case of benefits and harms which are
due to non-wrongful harm-doing.
48 These distinctions and the discussion of problems associated with each principle
in the context of climate change justice have been most helpfully introduced and
discussed by Simon Caney (2005, 2006b) and Axel Gosseries (2004). In many ways
our argument in this section is indebted to their interpretations and analyses.
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be labelled restitution. Restitution is characterised by the wrongdoer resti-
tuting the good – if possible in kind49 – to the wronged person. This serves
the aim of restoring the moral relationship between the wrongdoer and the
wronged person (cf. Meyer (2005, p. 228)). A second version of compen-
satory payments identifies the beneficiary of wrongful emissions as respon-
sible for providing compensation: the Beneficiary Pays Principle (BePP).
A third version ascribes the duty to pay compensation to the wrongdo-
ing community: the Community Pays Principle (CoPP). The expression of
a “wrongdoing and compensating community” is somewhat misleading in
that we do not want to postulate a collective agent. In this text we presup-
pose normative individualism.50 The convenient shorthand of “a community
having the duty to pay compensation for its wrongdoing” stands for: some
individuals have a duty to pay compensation due to their membership in a
community of which (they or) some other individual members committed
wrongs.
In discussing these three principles, we will have to answer two questions
in turn for each principle: How plausible is it as a principle of compensatory
justice in general? And: what kind of compensatory measures can it justify
in the climate change context?
In order to illustrate more easily why compensatory measures are difficult
to justify we will make use of the numerical example from the last section
again. For this section, we add the assumption that the emissions from
period I cause climate damages in period II, say 5 for people in the North
and 10 for people in the South. We use this example to illustrate the
arguments against the view that the provision of compensatory measures is
the most adequate response to climate damages.
49 Since in our case the good in question is climate quality, restitution in kind is difficult
to imagine.
50 Normative individualism implies that, strictly speaking and at least in a non-
derivative sense, only individuals and not communities act, have rights and duties,
can be benefited, etc.
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Period?I Period?II Period?I Period?II
For?North?Old 6 ?
For?North?Middle 6 3 ? ?5
For?North?Young 3 ?5
For?South?Old 4 ?
For?South?Middle 4 2 ? ?10
For?South?Young 2 ?10
Benefits?associated?with?
emissions?from?period?I?in?
Climate?Damages?associated?
with?emissions?from?period?I?in
Figure 6
4.4.2 Compensatory Payments for Climate Damages
There are six basic problems for justifying compensatory payments in the
context of climate damages:51
1. Potential payers might be dead.52
2. Potential payers might not have exceeded their fair shares.
3. Potential payers might have been (blamelessly) ignorant.
4. Potential recipients might (due to the non-identity problem) only be
said to be harmed according to a threshold conception of harm.53
51 In section 4.3 we already mentioned the most important of these six problems when
we sketched the three objections to taking historical emissions into account for the
purpose of determining a just distribution of emission rights.
52 By potential payers we mean people who were either causally responsible for cli-
mate change or who are placed into beneficial circumstances that are partly due
to emission-generating activities. By potential recipients we mean people who are
placed into living conditions which would be more favourable if it were not for cli-
mate change.
53 The non-identity problem precludes us from saying that future people are harmed
(or benefited) by actions that are necessary conditions of their existence (cf. Parfit
(1984)). This is so if we understand harm in the sense of being made worse off by
an action than one would otherwise be. There is however another conception of
harm which successfully evades the non-identity problem: By claiming that people
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5. Potential payers might (due to the non-identity problem) not be said
to have benefited.
6. Potential recipients might not be wrongfully harmed because climate
change may also have non-anthropogenic sources.
First let us look at the principle that demands that the emitter must pay
compensation for his wrongful emissions to those who are wronged (EmPP).
There is not much doubt that in general (that is, disregarding whether it
can usefully be applied to the climate change problem) the idea of such
compensation is very well supported by our moral intuitions.54 This is in
can be said to be harmed by actions which make them fall below a certain pre-
specified threshold, future people can also be said to be harmed by actions which
are a necessary condition of their existence. For a treatment of these issues, see
Meyer and Roser (2008).
54 Note that we distinguish this principle from “polluter pays principles” (or also “strict
liability principles”) by focusing only on wrongful emitters while the polluter pays
principle or a strict liability principle or also Moellendorf’s (2002, p. 98) causal
principle make any emitter – whether wrongful or not – pay. Such principles, which
make people pay who are causally responsible for emissions irrespective of their
culpability, can obviously not serve as principles of compensatory justice in the
narrow sense defined above. This is however not to say, that in practice policies
relying on such a polluter pays principle could never be justified for certain areas of
environmental policy. It can legitimately be put into practice for three reasons:
(i) In practice, in some areas of environmental policy it might be difficult to hold
wrongful and non-wrongful emitters apart; or the two categories might overlap to
such a large degree that it would be too cumbersome to hold them apart. Thus,
enacting a polluter pays principle might serve as an approximation for the policy
which demands compensation from wrongdoers.
(ii) The policy might also serve as an approximation for a policy based on the
redistributive rationale: Because polluters often benefit from their polluting action,
making them pay something to the harmed can be seen as evening out undeserved
deviations from a just baseline.
(iii) A third and completely unrelated justification is based on instrumental
grounds in the following way: Making people pay for harmful activities sets the
right incentives from an economic perspective and thus generates efficiency. If emit-
ters (who are assumed to act self-interestedly as homines oeconomici) have to bear
the external costs that appear as side-effects of their actions they will only perform
an emitting action in case the benefits exceed the costs. Thus, in a society where
emitters (whether wrongful or not) are made to pay, all and only those emitting
actions will be performed that have a net benefit which brings forth efficiency. How-
ever, such an instrumental justification for making emitters pay has no necessary
link to the idea of compensatory or redistributive justice. This can also be seen
by noting that such an instrumental justification in fact provides no rationale at
all for why the emitters’ payments should be handed over to the people harmed
by the emissions. The principle’s whole idea is to deter people from emitting on a
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contrast to BePP and CoPP where the principle itself – even apart from its
application to the climate change problem – is in need of some supporting
arguments. The only dispute in the case of EmPP is whether it can justify
compensatory payments for the specific case of climate damages or not.
If EmPP is put to the service of justifying compensatory payments one
has to identify wrongful emitters and wrongfully harmed persons. Someone
emits wrongfully if (i) he exceeded his fair share and (ii) he knew or was
liable to know about the harmfulness of his emissions. Someone is wrongfully
harmed by emissions if he either is worse off due to wrongful emissions than
he would otherwise be or falls below the specified threshold of harm due
to the wrongful emissions (or both) (see fn. 53). Let us use the numerical
example to look at what duties to pay compensation and what rights to
receive compensation the EmPP can and cannot justify in period II:
1. North-Old and South-Old cannot have a duty to pay compensation
because they are dead.
2. South-Middle (as well as South-Old) did not exceed its fair share and
so must not pay.
3. North-Middle (as well as the other emitters from period I) might not
have been aware, and might neither have been liable to be aware, of
the problematic nature of its emissions and thus it can be excused by
ignorance of wrongdoing.55
4. North-Young and South-Young can only claim to be wronged – and
claim with it a right to compensation – if they fall below the threshold
as specified by the threshold conception of harm. They cannot be said
to be harmed simply because climate quality is worse than it would
be had there been less emissions in period I.
non-optimal level by making them pay.
55 See fn. 40 for some plausible dates behind which one could claim to have been
blamelessly ignorant.
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So, if one could legitimately be excused by ignorance in period I, then
EmPP cannot identify any wrongful emitter at all to pay compensation
payments. If not, it can still only ascribe compensatory duties to North-
Middle (even though it is only one of four agents causally responsible for
climate change in period II). EmPP also has some trouble in identifying
wronged agents: In contrast to South-Middle (and North-Middle), South-
Young (and North-Young) can only be said to be wronged – and thus be the
rightful recipient of compensatory payments – if they fall below the relevant
threshold.
Of course, some assumptions that we made in the numerical model might
be loosened and then some duty bearers or right bearers might be identified.
The assumptions could be relaxed in the following directions: First, period
I could be defined as being at a point of time when the excuse from igno-
rance has no more force. Second, damages could be modelled as starting to
materialise immediately after the emissions were produced and not only in
the next period. Third, also the South might exceed its fair share. Fourth,
the relevance of the non-identity problem could be less stressed. Our pur-
pose in making these strict assumptions, though, was to highlight all the
problems that potentially come up when one makes an attempt at justifying
compensatory payments based on EmPP.
Let us turn to the principle that demands that those who have bene-
fited from wrongful emissions must pay compensation (BePP). First we
have to ask whether it is a legitimate principle in general, that is, apart
from the climate change question, to make the reception of benefits from
a wrong imply the reception of duties of compensation. Applied to the is-
sue of climate damages the question is the following: Why should people
who have committed no wrongful emissions but have only benefited (either
from emission-generating activities or from climate change itself) have to
pay compensation? Does this not go against the spirit of our definition of
compensatory payments as being grounded in a wrong? Note that the peo-
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ple who received benefits from past emission-generating activities without
engaging in emission-generating activities themselves did not ask for these
benefits; they were imposed on them, so to speak.
There is no completely obvious answer to the question of whether ben-
efiting from wrongdoing creates a duty of compensation. The difficulty of
judging this issue is based on two reasons. First, if one was benefited by
a wrong then the benefit is most definitely not deserved. It is deserved as
little as any other benefit one receives by luck (if anything, it is deserved
even less).56 And based on considerations of distributive justice one can see
any undeserved benefit (and harm) as calling for redistribution regardless
of whether one received this benefit due to a wrongful action or brute luck.
But what we are asking in discussing the BePP is whether the reception
of benefits from a wrong implies a duty of compensation (that is, a duty
which for its justification presupposes the wrongness of the action) and not
whether it creates a duty of redistribution. The second reason why it is
difficult to judge the BePP as a principle of compensatory justice is that in
our daily lives we are not used to think about cases where the people who
commit the wrong do not coincide with the people who benefit from the
wrong (cf. Anwander (2005, p. 40)). But here our question is whether ben-
efiting from a wrong gives reason to compensate independently from having
contributed to the wrong.
Still, the BePP has to be judged even if it is difficult. On the one hand,
there are clear examples where we do not judge benefiting from an injustice
as calling for compensation. Note for example that everybody who uses an
X-ray profits from how this technology was refined using data from Hiro-
shima (see Anwander (2005, p. 40)). On the other hand, there are intuitions
to the contrary. Gosseries (2004), for example, enables us to see benefiting
from an action without paying the associated costs in the light of the notion
56 Note though, that in our non-ideal world, it is often possible that by accident benefits
from wrongdoing bring an individual who doesn’t get the goods he or she deserves
in the real world closer to the level of wellbeing he or she were at in the ideally just
state of affairs.
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of free-riding. Present-day inhabitants of the North can be seen as trans-
generational free-riders because they currently benefit from past emissions
that impose costs on people currently living in the South. Importantly,
Gosseries distinguishes two interpretations of the way in which free-riding
can be seen as objectionable. The first interpretation relies on considera-
tions of distributive justice and this is not the relevant case for the BePP.
It is the idea sketched a few lines above that, of course, any undeserved
benefits and harms can be seen as calling for redistribution – and benefits
and harms due to injustice committed by others are simply one instance of
undeserved benefits and harms. But if one relies on this interpretation it is
difficult to see what is specific about benefiting from a wrongful action in
contrast to benefiting from some other kind of action or event for which one
is not responsible. All that one could possibly argue for is that, intuitively,
there seems to be weightier reason to even out undeserved deviations from
a just baseline which are due to a wrong than to even out undeserved devi-
ations which are due to more general causes. The second interpretation of
why free-riding is objectionable relies on what Gosseries calls “interactive
justice,” which is similar to our conception of compensatory justice. It is
the relevant case for making use of BePP to legitimise compensatory pay-
ments. This second way gains some plausibility if one regards benefiting
from an action or a scheme or a policy as in some way involving an action,
namely the action of willingly accepting being benefited by it. Accepting
being benefited by wrongful emissions can possibly be seen as transferring
(some of) the wrongdoer’s duty of compensation to the beneficiary. Another
basis for the position that benefiting from wrongdoing calls for compensa-
tion is proposed by Butt. He claims that condemnation of injustice implies
not being willing to benefit from it while others suffer from it: “My claim
is that taking our nature as moral agents seriously requires not only that
we be willing not to commit acts of injustice ourselves, but that we hold a
genuine aversion to injustice and its lasting effects. We make a conceptual
error if we condemn a given action as unjust, but are not willing to reverse
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or mitigate its effects on the grounds that it has benefited us” (Butt (2007,
p. 143)).
Even though we are sceptical of the position that benefiting from wrong-
ful actions not only gives rise to duties of redistribution but also to duties
of compensation, we will not commit ourselves to a definite answer. Rather,
we will note that even if the BePP could be defended as a principle in gen-
eral, there is still something very questionable about applying it to climate
damages. Due to the non-identity problem, North-Young and South-Young
(who constitute the people who did not emit themselves) cannot be said be
benefited at all. Without past emissions they would not be worse off but
rather not exist at all (this is the fifth problem from the above list). And
even if the non-identity-problem were less relevant, there still remains an
obstacle: If voluntary acceptance of benefits should prove to be a condition
of their giving rise to compensatory duties, one would have to address the
difficult issue of whether abstaining from emigrating from an industrialised
country (or rejecting the benefits of living there in some other way) can
really count as willingly accepting these benefits. Thus, although BePP
seemingly has a larger base of possible duty bearers than the EmPP – not
only the emitters themselves but anybody who benefited from the wrongful
emissions – it is no more successful in identifying duty bearers than EmPP.
So, both EmPP and the more questionable BePP can only justify a small
amount of compensatory measures or none at all. Let us now turn to the
principle that demands that present-day members of a community must pay
for the wrongs that past members of the community committed (CoPP).
We will not commit ourselves to a certain view as to what the adequate
specification of the community would be in the context of climate change
but we will use countries or other communities with a legal form as the most
suggestive examples.
Note that we in no way presuppose the collective moral responsibility of
today’s people living in the North for the emissions of their ancestors in
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the sense that the currently living would be able to incur blame or guilt
for past wrongful emissions. We want to place our arguments firmly on
normative individualist grounds. (If one was keen on using the language
of “collective responsibility” then what we are arguing for is that members
of a community can have collective outcome or remedial responsibility (cf.
Miller (2004, pp. 244–47)) for actions of other members of the community,
that is: due to their membership in the community they can have a duty
to shoulder benefits and burdens which go along with the actions of other
members without being in any way morally or causally responsible for these
actions).
Taking costs on ourselves due to our membership in a collective (and not
due to our own actions) is not something alien to our thinking: Countries
pay back debts that the governments of earlier generations have taken up,
managers resign from jobs due to mistakes of their employees and Switzer-
land is faced with demands to compensate victims of World War II long
after many people of this era have died. Is this justifiable? Some of the
arguments adduced for it rely on non-individualistic premises; some of the
arguments are non-starters – such as the idea that simple identification with
some community is enough for incurring a duty to compensate others for
the community’s wrongdoings (Imagine that you identify with a political
party without being an official member of it – do you have any moral duty
to help pay the fines if its officials accept bribes?); and some of the more
successful justifications for duties due to community membership cannot
easily be extended to the case of transgenerational communities – such as
the idea that people who mutually cooperate with each other and share in
a common objective share the duty to compensate others for the wrongs
thereby committed (In what way can present Germans be said to cooperate
with past Germans in the project of fascism?). There are, however, sound
arguments to the effect that community membership can, in principle, be a
reason to ascribe duties to presently living members of a transgenerational
community to provide compensation for the wrongs committed by earlier
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members. One can reason as follows (for an extensive treatment, see Meyer
(2005, ch. IV and V)):
People can value their membership in certain groups (communities or
polities). Accordingly, they will be willing to accept standing under obliga-
tions of preserving the group to which they belong. People can have valid
reasons for understanding themselves in such a way. First, the group to
which they belong might exhibit a general value by being, say, a just or
tolerant community. All people have reason to value belonging to such a
community insofar as living in, say, a just society is – individually and col-
lectively – of intrinsic value. The groups typically are transgenerational in
character: They comprise many generations, have a past and a future. If
justice requires, inter alia, providing measures of restitution and compen-
sation for wrongful harm-doing such transgenerational communities will be
just, inter alia, by providing compensation to presently living victims of in-
justices that earlier members of the community committed. Second, people
will value their membership in such groups for a further reason: the group
might exhibit particular features that are highly relevant for the wellbeing
of its members since they manifest particular ways of communal life. Due
to these features of their group’s culture people have access to particular
options that are highly valuable to them given who they are: the particular
culture of their group will often have shaped their social identity in decisive
ways.
The two types of reasons for holding membership in one’s community or
polity to be valuable are interrelated: The intrinsic value of our being a
member of a society will depend in part on the ways in which we relate to
its particular features, yet we clearly do not attribute intrinsic value to just
any society. Rather, for a society to have intrinsic value it will have to fulfil
certain minimal requirements concerning its internal and external relations.
What these minimal conditions amount to will depend on what universal
and particularly weighty reasons for action people can be said to have. It
seems very plausible to suggest that people ought to value their membership
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in a society on the condition that their society is just to a reasonable degree.
Thus, for them to be able to attribute intrinsic value to their membership,
they will have to contribute to the creation and strengthening of the institu-
tions that are necessary for their society fulfilling its obligations of justice.
Arguably, among these obligations are obligations to provide measures of
compensation for wrongs that were committed publicly57 (or even in the
name of the community) by its members in the past.
So given that the intrinsic value of communities is only present under
certain conditions one has reason to see to it that these conditions are ful-
filled. And if one of those conditions is that present-day victims of historical
injustice are compensated, one has reason based on valuing the community
to do so. Partly, the reasons one has can be understood to reflect the idea
of a natural duty to justice: We all have the duty to support the realisation
of justice and thus, if membership in a community, and the creation of ade-
quate institutions in this community, and the support of the specific goal of
compensation payments to victims of historical injustice are necessary pre-
requisites for justice becoming a reality, then one has a duty to work towards
these goals. This is so not as a matter of personal preference of identifying
with one’s community but reflects categorical reasons: carrying out the nat-
ural duty of justice serves a good, the protection of which is thought to be
of such importance that people are thought to have categorical reasons for
doing so, that is, reasons whose validity does not derive from the contingent
desires of the people on whom they apply. At the same time, since mem-
bership in the community is valued in part due to its specific features (its
57 We will not discuss further what “publicly” exactly amounts to. The basic point is
that, of course, a community cannot be held responsible for just any kind of “private”
wrong that its members do to members of other communities. The community ties
only become relevant when the wrongs that are committed have some public or
collective aspect in the sense that the wrong had a pervasive and important place
in the community’s social structure or was even committed “in the name” of the
community. The emission of greenhouse gases and the policies that promote and
enable industrialisation clearly seem to fulfill the criterion of being a constitutive
element of the community’s public and shared way of living. How much someone is
emitting is to a large extent not just a personal decision but is strongly dependent
on the country’s stage of industrialisation.
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history and unique communal ways of life it realises), their members fulfill-
ing their duties of justice will reflect their wanting to uphold a particular
self-understanding, namely that of being a participating member of their
community. For they understand that they can wish to uphold the partic-
ular communal way of life of their society (based, in part, on its particular
features) only if their society is sufficiently just. This, arguably, requires the
provision of restitution and compensation for wrongs that were committed
publicly (or even in the name of the community) by its members in the
past. So, the bottom line is that there are ways in which liberals relying
on normative individualism can justify why present-day members of coun-
tries should accept the duty to make compensatory payments for wrongful
emissions of earlier members of the country as demanded by CoPP. Thus,
the scope of possible duty-bearers is extended so as to include North-Young
and North-Middle paying for the wrong done by the emissions of North-Old.
They do this as members of the community of the North.
Note however that compensatory payments along the lines of CoPP still
only cover wrongful emissions. And thus, emissions made under ignorance
about their harmful nature, and emissions that did not exceed the fair share,
as well as non-anthropogenic causes of climate change all remain uncovered.
Actually, reliance on CoPP can only complement EmPP and BePP in the
sense that it escapes the first problem of the above list (that is, potential
polluters might be dead) with the other problems remaining unaffected.
4.4.3 Redistribution as a Response to Climate Damages
Compensation payments for climate damages are difficult to justify for the
reasons offered above. And, more importantly, insofar as such arguments
(for EmPP, BePP, or CoPP) actually succeed in justifying some compen-
satory measures, they only justify them for part of those who cause or suffer
from climate change.58
58 And if someone holds that more than one of the three principles of compensatory
justice is successful in defending compensatory measures for past emissions he still
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Still, the fact that the South has to carry such a large share of climate
damages seems to be a situation that cries out for some kind of response.
And of course, compensation (in the narrow sense of wrongdoing persons
paying something to the wronged persons on the grounds of the injustice
committed) is not the only kind of possible response. Rather, given that
many effects of climate change can be seen as undeserved harms – and
harms which go along with undeserved benefits for other persons – levelling
off such effects on the basis of a concern for distributive justice is an equally
plausible response. In assuming that the priority view is the correct kind
of principle for distributing emission rights we assumed that principles of
distributive justice do apply at the global level (see among others Pogge
(1989)). And consequently, we believe that principles of distributive justice
can also be applied (at least to some degree) to the distribution of duties
to pay for adaptation measures to those who suffer from climate damages.
Of course, to common moral intuition, demands of compensatory justice
seem to have a stronger force than demands based simply on evening out
undeserved benefits or harms, particularly at the global level (cf. Miller
(2004, fn. 1) and Gosseries (2004, p. 55)). We do not necessarily want to
question that view: Compensation payments might have a certain priority
before redistributive concerns. However, in the context of climate damages,
compensation payments are only justifiable for such a small part of the prob-
lem that it is appropriate to direct attention primarily to the redistributive
demands. The focus must be turned to sharing undeserved benefits and
harms equitably rather than focusing on compensating wronged persons in
view of the limited applicability of the latter enterprise.
In practice, a prioritarian redistributive scheme concerned with climate
damages would mean that those who are lucky in terms of not being affected
has to define how the three principles complement or replace each other. For exam-
ple: if one were of the opinion that both the EmPP and the BePP can legitimately
be applied, one cannot eschew specifying whether it is primarily the emitter or the
beneficiary or both who must shoulder the costs for the compensatory payments (see
also Caney (2006b, p. 472)).
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much by climate change should assist those who are unlucky in terms of
being affected heavily. They owe this assistance independently of who caused
climate change. Thus according to the redistributive approach to climate
damages, even if, contrary to actual fact, it historically were the South
who predominantly created the climate problem, it is still those who are
vulnerable to a small extent who should support adaptive measures in those
countries where people are more vulnerable.59
Another way to install a prioritarian redistributive scheme concerned with
climate damages would differ from the one just mentioned in not only aim-
ing at a just pattern concerning the specific good called “climate damages”
(cf. option 1 from section 4.2.2) but in rather taking into account the whole
background distribution of other goods (cf. option 2 from section 4.2.2).60
Taking into account the background distribution amounts to making the
wealthy – that is, the wealthy in general and not only the wealthy in terms
of having to cope with few climate damages – assist those who are vulnerable
to climate change. Of course, being wealthy and not being very vulnerable
is correlated quite strongly, but not perfectly. Insofar as they are corre-
lated, both options – taking and not taking the background distribution
into account – primarily make the North pay the bill.
In the real world this would mean that countries have to be ranked ac-
cording to their vulnerability to climate change and those that are highly
vulnerable get privileged access to the resources available in a global adap-
tation fund. The above argument suggests that such a fund would have to
be paid for either by those who exhibit low vulnerability or by the wealthy.
To some limited extent, it could also be supplied with payments by those
who despite all the problems mentioned in section 4.4.2 stand under com-
59 In terms of figure 6, enacting a prioritarian distribution between the North and the
South of the specific good of climate damages would amount to a transfer of 5 units
of benefits from the North to the South.
60 Instead of going directly from only looking at climate damages all the way to taking
into account the whole background distribution of other goods, one might also stop in
the middle, so to speak, and at least take into account the already existing inequality
in the climatic conditions that people face even without climate change.
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pensatory duties. Within countries, raising the money for such a global
adaptation fund through progressive taxation could serve as an approxima-
tion for making the less vulnerable pay. At the intra-national level, aiming
at additional redistribution from the hardly vulnerable to the highly vul-
nerable might take many different forms, for example government subsidies
for adaptation measures in poor communities.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter discussed a fair way of allocating the mitigation and adapta-
tion costs associated with climate change, in particular in the light of the
benefits and damages brought forth by past emissions. It presupposed a
prioritarian theory of distributive justice and generally proceeded by ab-
stracting from the background inequality existing in the real world. It first
discussed mitigation and concluded that the South should get higher per
capita emission rights than the North because it has less benefits associated
with past emissions to start with. It then discussed who should come up
for adaptation costs and argued that it is difficult to frame the duty of the
North to those who are highly vulnerable as a duty of compensation but that
it should primarily be seen as a duty grounded in concerns of distributive
justice.
Even though we separated the issue of mitigation (sections 4.2 and 4.3)
and adaptation (section 4.4) for analytical purposes, there might be ample
reason to link the two issues, in particular when it comes to practical policy
making. In a “local justice approach” (cf. section 4.2.2) there is no general
guideline on which goods to discuss jointly and which goods to discuss sep-
arately and it is of course not at all far-fetched to discuss the two climate
change related goods of emission rights and climate damages in conjunc-
tion, particularly given that we have shown that both primarily pose issues
of distributive justice.61 By treating mitigation and adaptation jointly, one
61 In terms of figure 6, enacting a prioritarian distribution of both benefits and damages
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could for example argue for assisting those with above average vulnerability
through the specific “currency” of emission rights. In linking adaptation
and mitigation one could also take note of interdependencies, such as the
need for economic progress (and thus the need for emission rights) in poor
countries in order to diminish vulnerability (and thus adaptation costs). It
is also a desideratum to link up the discussion more with the background
distribution of other goods, which would in general strengthen the duties
of the North even more but would in addition highlight more clearly the
duties of wealthy individuals within poor countries. Linking the discussion
of climate change related goods more closely to the background inequality
would in practice point to the need for linking development and climate
policies.62
Regardless of which goods are treated jointly both in the policy arena
and for purposes of analytical discussion, the message stays the same that
almost any argument on climate justice ascribes larger shortcomings to the
North than to the South in comparison with the ideally just state of affairs.
Since there is not much to dispute concerning this general conclusion, the
interest of any argument must lie in the rationale it gives for this conclusion.
It has been the goal of this chapter to give a plausible justification for this
widely accepted claim, in particular by stressing how past emission gener-
ating activities yield unequal benefits and harms for the presently living –
an inequality which generally calls for the application of distributive justice
rather than compensatory justice.
jointly would prescribe giving all the 10 emission rights which are up for distribution
in period II to the South and would in addition prescribe a transfer of 2 units of
benefits from the North to the South. This would leave the people in the South who
are alive in period II (taken as a whole group) with zero net benefits added up over
periods I and II. The same would be true for the North.
62 Posner and Sunstein (2007) ask the following legitimate question: If the higher
duties of the North are justified by considerations of distributive justice, and if
redistributive goals could more effectively be reached by more general redistributive
measures than simply climate change related payments, why narrow the focus down
to redistribution in terms of the goods of emission rights and support for adaptation
measures?
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